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OBJECTIVE, MULTIPLISTIC, AND RELATIVE
TRUTH IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND LEGAL EDUCATION
PAUL

T. WANGERIN*

INTRODUCTION

Two thousand years ago, Protagoras, a teacher of lawyers,
began what has since become one of the most enduring and painful philosophic debates in western civilization. "Man is the measure of all things," Protagoras insisted, arguing that everything
is relative.1 Since nothing in nature is fixed and certain, Protagoras urged, human beings must create their own meanings and
truths. Plato claimed otherwise.2 Some things, Plato argued,
are fixed and certain. Truth itself has an objective meaning
which does not vary from time to time or from place to place.
* Associate Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. Many people have read
this article and have made helpful comments. My principal debt in this context is to
psychologists William Perry, Jane Loevinger, Patricia King, and Norma Haan. Richard
Bernstein, a philosopher, also gave me several very helpful suggestions. In addition, a
number of legal educators made useful comments, notably Jack Himmelstein, James Boyd
White, Charles and Randall Kelso, Michael Josephson, and Stephen Young. Several of my
colleagues, particularly Donald Beschle, have patiently listened to me talk about this essay
for the last two years. Their remarks have been most valuable. Finally, over the last five
years countless law students have spoken to me endlessly about what they felt happening to
themselves as they passed through law school. My greatest debt is to them.
1. RELATIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL 6 (J. Meiland & M. Krausz eds. 1982).
Much of the following discussion of relativism is drawn from this outstanding group of
essays. See also R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983); E. GELLNER, RELATIVISM AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 83-100 (1985) (a very readable discussion);R. KANE, FREE WILL AND VALUES
(1985); OBJECTIVITY AND CULTURAL DIVERGENCE (S. Brown ed. 1984) (a series of essays
that rejects the notion of cultural relativism); H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY
(1981) (extensive critique of cognitive relativism); RATIONALITY AND RELATIVISM (M.
Hollis & S. Lukes eds. 1982); RELATIVISM AND THE STUDY OF MAN (H. Schoeck & J.
Wiggins eds. 1961); Kurtines & Gewirtz, Certainty and Morality: Objectivistic versus
RelativisticApproaches, in MORALITY, MORAL BEHAVIOR, AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 3
(W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz eds. 1984) [hereinafter Kurtines, Certainty and Morality];

Peterson, Remarks on Three Formulationsof Ethical Relativism, 95 ETHICS 887 (1985);
Symposium: Is Relativism Defensible?, 67 MONIST 293-482 (1984) (difficult series of essays
by a number of philosophers). See generally A. OLDENQUIST, READINGS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY (1965) (numerous discussions of relativism). An excellent discussion of the
ideas of Plato and Protagoras in the context of legal education is Heffernan, Not Socrates,
but Protagoras: The Sophistic Basis of Legal Education, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 399 (1980).
2. See generally R. KANE, supra note 1, for an analysis of Plato's ideas on the concept
of relativism. This book also contains an extensive bibliography on relativism.
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According to Plato, human beings do not create meanings and
truths. Rather, human beings discover truths that exist independently of human control.
For many centuries, Plato's arguments prevailed. To be
sure, down through the centuries, some support always existed
for relativism in connection with moral and ethical principles.
However, by the late eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant's ideas
reflected a strong philosophic consensus regarding the objective
nature of truth.
Notwithstanding the seeming victory in western thought of
Plato's and Kant's views about the existence of objective truth,
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought new vigor to proponents of Protagoras' competing idea of relativism. Surprisingly, however, scientists rather than philosophers brought
about that resurgence. By the mid-nineteenth century, scientists
had become increasingly able to demonstrate that most accepted
truths about the physical universe were themselves constantly
open to question and change. Long-accepted scientific truths
stood exposed as false. Human knowledge was in a state of constant flux. Late in the nineteenth century, scientists announced
the Second Law of Thermodynamics and its concept of entropy,
which revealed that progression is always toward lack of organization. In the early twentieth century, scientists discovered relativity and the uncertainty principle in quantum physics. These
three scientific discoveries suggested that human knowledge
regarding the physical universe was not the only thing in a constant state of flux. The universe itself was in flux.
Gradual acceptance by modern scientists of this idea of flux
in knowledge about physical truths-and of flux in the nature of
the physical universe itself--encouraged modern philosophers to
resurrect Protagoras' ancient theory of relativism.' Early in the
twentieth century, William James and John Dewey argued for a
relativistic perspective. 6 Later philosophers of science such as
3. See generally I. KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (N.K. Smith ed. 1969).
4. See generally R. KANE, supra note 1, at 189-205; T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
5. "What, then, is truth?" Nietzsche asked in one of the boldest comments about
relativism. "A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms-in short,
a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished
poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to
" THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 46-47 (W. Kaufmann ed. 1954).
a people ..
6. See generally Kohlberg & Mayer, Development as the Aim of Education, 42 HARV.
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Michael Polanyi7 and Thomas Kuhn" brought even greater legitimacy to the relativistic perspective.
C. Behan McCullagh, a modem philosopher, provides an
excellent definition of the modem perspective of relativism. This
perspective claims:
(i) that people's beliefs about the world are largely determined
by their perceptual equipment-their eyes, microscopes and so
on, by their conceptual systems and by their standards of
rationality; (ii) that all these are known to have varied from
culture to culture, and from time to time within our own culture; and (iii) that there is no independent way of deciding
which set of determining factors (perceptual equipment, conceptual system and standard of rationality) will yield true
descriptions of reality.9
"[W]e live in an incoherent and elemental flux," James Boyd
White recently wrote. "[N]o reasoning, no meaning is possible.... no earth or rock to stand or walk upon but only shifting
sea and sky and wind.. ..",,
To be sure, many modem philosophers argue convincingly
for the existence of some objective truth. Ronald Dworkin" and
John Rawls,' 2 for example, have little sympathy for a relativistic
perspective. Furthermore, Allan Bloom's recent and widely
read book, The Closing of the American Mind, is a sustained diatribe against relativism. 13 Some modem philosophers, most
notably Richard Bernstein, argue that the classic confrontation
between the seemingly irreconcilable perspectives of relativism
and objectivism can in fact be resolved. 4 Nevertheless, one conclusion seems obvious. Although it is probably safe to say that
the relativistic perspective has not gained widespread acceptance
EDUC. REv. 449 (1972) (extensive discussion of Dewey); Phillips, Was William James

Telling the Truth After All?, 67 MONIST 419 (1984).
7. An excellent introduction to Polanyi's very difficult work is R. GELWICK, THE
WAY OF DISCOVERY (1977).
8. See generally T. KUHN, supra note 4.

9. McCullagh, The Intelligibilityof Cognitive Relativism, 67 MONIST 325, 327 (1984).
10. J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONsTrTUIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTERS AND COMMUNITY 277-78 (1984).

11. See generally, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
12. See generally, eg., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
13. See generally A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).

14. See generally R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 1. One philosopher made the point in a
beautiful metaphor. "[Tihe battle over relativism... having continued with fluctuating
intensity for several millenia, is probably more aptly conceived as a war of attrition rather
than as a one-time fray." Phillips, supra note 6, at 419.
HeinOnline -- 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1239 1987-1988
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among modem philosophers, 15 nonetheless for the first time in
two millenia relativism is not a discredited philosophic idea.
It was noted at the outset of this brief discussion of the
ideas of relativism and objectivism that Protagoras was first a
teacher, and second a teacher of lawyers. So too is James Boyd
White, the "shifting sea" writer previously quoted.1 6 Teachers
of lawyers, it is suggested, have special responsibilities when
exploring with their students the nature of truth. Like all teachers, they must communicate with large numbers of students who
frequently will hold widely diverse ideas. In addition, teachers
should help students develop into skilled independent thinkers,
that is, thinkers who do not simply accept another's definition of
truth. Therefore, teachers who wish to teach well must themselves understand that a fundamental dispute about the objective
or relative nature of truth exists and that the dispute undoubtedly affects their own teaching in subtle, but important, ways.
First, teachers must understand that this fundamental dispute
pervades the substantive component of their own special disciplines. Knowledge about their fields is in a state of flux. Second,
they must understand that students may well look at and understand the nature of truth in ways very different from their
teachers.
Law school teachers share with all teachers the responsibilities just described. However, law school teachers in the United
States have additional duties which principally fall upon them
because they teach their students to operate within the adversary
system of justice. 17 The existence of that system, it is suggested,
creates enormous developmental difficulties for students.
This Article, which principally concerns the special responsibilities of law school professors, has three parts. After briefly
discussing the work of John Dewey and Jean Piaget, Part 118
demonstrates that William Perry, a developmental psychologist,
describes a cognitive development sequence in the intellectual
abilities of young adults that can readily be used to catalogue the
various developmental phases through which many law students
15. See Vallicella, Relativism, Truth and the Symmetry Thesis, 67 MONisT 452
(1984). Vallicella notes, however, that while relativism among philosophers tends to be a

bad thing, relativism among social scientists is a good thing.
16. See supra text accompanying note 10.
17. Actually, legal educators have an additional special responsibility in this context,
a responsibility brought about by the widespread use in law school classrooms of the socalled Socratic method of instruction. See generally Heffernan, supra note 1.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 23-140.
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seem to pass. This Article uses both empirical and anecdotal
data to link Perry's ideas to law school students. Perry describes
intellectual movement in young people as movement toward
gradual acceptance of multiplicity and relativism and then as
movement toward commitment in relativism. This part of the
Article also briefly compares Perry's scheme to Karen Kitchener's and Patricia King's ideas about the development of reflective judgment. Unlike Perry's sequence, Kitchener's and King's
sequence suggests that intellectual movement in young adults is
gradually toward the appreciation of objective truth. Finally,
Part I discusses some cognitive developmental dangers that legal
education poses for young adults.
Part II of this Article 19 explores theories of moral development, as opposed to cognitive development. The theories principally discussed in this section are those of psychologists
Lawrence Kolhberg and Norma Haan. Kolhberg describes
moral development as the gradual movement through a series of
stages toward ultimate appreciation of objective truth. Haan
disagrees. She thinks development involves an increased ability
to engage in what is essentially relativistic moral dialogue.
Again, this Article uses empirical and anecdotal data to explore
these different ideas regarding law students and lawyers.
Part 11120 links the dispute about objectivism and relativism
to ideas put forward by radical critics in the fields of legal education and developmental psychology. In legal education, members of the Critical Legal Studies movement attack mainstream
legal theory from the far left on the political spectrum. In developmental psychology, feminist psychologists similarly attack
mainstream developmental theory. Both of these attacks are
launched, it will be shown, from a platform of relativistic truth.
An important introductory point must be made in an Article like the present one, an Article directed at widely differing
scholarly audiences. Some developmental theorists who read
this Article may think that parts of its discussion are overly simplistic. These readers may well be correct. They should remember, however, that few legal educators know anything at all
about developmental theory. Likewise, some legal educators
who read this Article may think that other parts of it are overly
simplistic. These readers may also be correct. They too, how19. See infra text accompanying notes 141-93.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 194-231.
HeinOnline -- 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1241 1987-1988
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ever, should consider that legal education is only one small part
of the very large world of educational theory. Finally, philosophers who read this essay undoubtedly will shudder at oversimplifications it contains about the epistemological concepts of
relativism and objectivism.2 1 They are correct to shudder. All
of these readers should keep in mind, however, that legal educators, psychologists, and philosophers have themselves made such
oversimplifications necessary. They have created the huge gulfs
that exist between these various fields of scholarly activity. They
have done so principally because they too often cloak their
respective work in professional and mystic
languages that
22
understanding.
from
nonspecialists
exclude
I.

COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN YOUNG ADULTS

Graham Gibbs, a British educational psychologist,
describes a monumental purpose for higher education. "[T]he
most important changes which take place as students develop
are changes in the way learning is conceptualized and in the
epistemological stance taken. ' 23 Gibbs makes a crucial point
about what has come to be called developmental education theory, 24 a field of study initially dominated by John Dewey and
Jean Piaget. "Working within a student's existing stage of [educational] development allows a certain limited scope for greater
efficiency, but often only a broad reconceptualization of what a
study task is about will provide scope for significant
'25
development.
21. I am grateful in particular to Richard Bernstein, a philosopher, for this
observation.
22. The phrase is drawn from Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
222, 223 (1984).
23. G. GIBBS, TEACHING STUDENTS TO LEARN: A STUDENT-CENTRED APPROACH

90 (1981).
24. Countless books and articles cataloguing the process of human development exist.
A number of these contain extensive discussions of developmental sequences in late
adolescents and young adults, that is, people the age of most law students. Some of these
materials include: CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 359-444, 530640 (0. Brim & J. Kagan eds. 1980); Arnstein, Young Adulthood Stages of Maturity, in
NORMALITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE:

A

CRITICAL INTEGRATION

109-44 (D. Offer & M.

Sabshin eds. 1984). An excellent general summary of the developmental effect of higher
education is Heath, What the EnduringEffects of HigherEducation Tell Us About a Liberal
Education, 47 J. HIGHER EDUC. 173 (1976). An article by Gutierrez, Counseling Law

Students, 64 J. COUNSELING & DEv. 130 (1985), provides a limited discussion but an
extensive bibliography. A good recent compilation of essays on developmental theories is
NEW DIRECTIONS IN EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (N. Entwistle ed. 1985).
25.

G. GIBBS, supra note 23, at 90.
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John Dewey2 6 believed that the sheer mass of knowledge
initially produced by the historical record and then continuously
expanded by the ongoing process of scientific discovery foreclosed any realistic attempt to use the educational process principally as a means for transmitting knowledge from one
generation to the next. Rather, Dewey argued, the educational
process must concentrate primarily on training young people to
think about knowledge. Such training allows members of the
new generation selectively to acquire knowledge already possessed by others and, more importantly, to generate new knowledge. Dewey also believed that this process of education
complemented modem, relativistic conceptions of knowledge
itself. To Dewey, knowledge was always in a state of flux,
always changing, developing, and contradicting the past. Therefore, any attempt to use the educational process primarily to
impart knowledge, rather than to impart skills of acquiring,
using, and creating knowledge, doomed itself to immediate
obsolescence.2 7
Unlike Dewey, who was primarily a philosopher, Jean
Piaget was primarily a scientist. 28 Over a period of many years,
Piaget painstakingly watched infants and young children as they
grew physically and intellectually. Piaget concluded that
growth in children was not the essentially random process that it
was thought to be. Rather, growth in infants and small children
proceeded in an orderly pattern through sequential developmental stages.
Piaget's ideas about the developmental sequence of children
can be quickly summarized. From birth until about two years of
age, Piaget observed, children think in a sensorimotor fashion,
that is, their thinking is directly linked to immediate sensory
experience. Between the ages of two and about seven, children
develop pre-operational thought. Such thought principally
involves increasing ability to use and to form symbols. Language, of course, is the most important aspect of symbolism.
Starting at about age six, children become capable of concrete
26. The following discussion of Dewey's work draws heavily from Kohlberg &
Mayer, supra note 6; see also Dewey, Logical Method and the Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17
(1924); Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century AmericaMajor Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1986).
27. A somewhat different approach to this idea is discussed in M. BIGGE, POSITIVE
RELATIVISM: AN EMERGENT EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 1-26 (1971).
28. Once again, this discussion draws heavily on Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 6; see

also M.

EYSENCK,

A HANDBOOK

OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

231-47 (1984).
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operations. They then can understand the idea of change and
can represent the transformation of concrete things. Piaget's
fourth and last stage is formal operations, which children reach
in early adolescence and develop through adulthood. This stage
involves the ability to think about the transformation of abstractions. All children, Piaget concluded, go through each of these
stages. More importantly, they all go through them in the same
sequence.
All of the theories of developmental education discussed in
this Article grew out of the ideas of Dewey and Piaget, 29 and all
share some common ground. For example, all developmental
educators believe that education should nourish students' natural interaction with a developing society or environment. In
addition, all of these educators believe that the acquisition of
knowledge involves active changes in patterns of thinking and
progressions through ordered, sequential stages. Moreover, the
developmental education tradition for all theorists stresses the
essential link between cognitive and moral development. All
developmental educators believe that the development of logical
and critical thought finds its principal meaning in a broad set of
moral values. At least one fundamental difference of opinion
exists, however, among the various developmental educators.
One group of theorists follows Dewey's lead regarding the ultimate uncertainty and relativism of all knowledge. This group
suggests that development is the process of learning to live with
uncertainty. The second group rejects the relativism aspect of
Dewey's work. They argue that development in human beings
involves progress toward the understanding and acceptance of
universally applicable and objectively true principles.
A.

William Perry'sStages of Intellectual Development
William Perry spent more than fifteen years conducting a

29. A good summary of various conflicting and complementary developmental
theories can be found in Rogers, Theories Underlying Student Development, in STUDENT
DEVELOPMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 10 (D. Creamer ed. 1980). For a similar
discussion and an extensive bibliography, see also DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE STUDENT
SERVICES PROGRAMS 192-97 (M. Barr & L. Keating eds. 1985); R. WINSTON, T. MILLER,
S. ENDER, & T. GUILES, DEVELOPMENTAL ACADEMIC ADVISING 102-11, 175-79 (1984).

See generally Drum, Understanding Student Development, in DIMENSIONS OF
INTERVENTION FOR STUDENT DEVELOPMENT 14 (W. Morrill, J. Hurst, & E. Oetting eds.
1980); Widick, Knefelkamp, & Parker, Student Development, in STUDENT SERVICES: A
HANDBOOK FOR THE PROFESSION 75 (U. Delworth & G. Hanson & Assoc. eds. 1980).
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longitudinal" study of the intellectual development of a group of
young adults. During this time he repeatedly interviewed hundreds of undergraduates at Harvard University and Radcliffe
College. Perry's 1970 report of his findings, Forms of Intellectual and EthicalDevelopment in the College Years: A Scheme,31
which was revised somewhat in an article published in 198 1,32
has become one of the most widely discussed and praised works
of modem educational psychology.33
30. A longitudinal study follows the same people over an extended period of time. A
cross-sectional study examines different people at the same time. Both types of studies have
intrinsic advantages and disadvantages.
31. W. PERRY, FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL AND ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
COLLEGE YEARS: A SCHEME (1970) [hereinafter FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT].
32. Perry, Cognitive and Ethical Growth: The Making of Meaning, in THE MODERN
AMERICAN COLLEGE: RESPONDING TO THE NEW REALITIES OF DIVERSE STUDENTS
AND A CHANGING SOCIETY 76 (A. Chickering & Assoc. eds. 1981) [hereinafter Cognitive
and Ethical Growth]. Excellent secondary discussions of Perry's work include J. RICH & J.
DEVITis, THEORIES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 74-83 (1985) [hereinafter J. RICH]; R.
SPRINTHALL & N.

SPRINTHALL, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY:

A DEVELOPMENTAL

APPROACH 380-83 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter R. SPRINTHALL]; Widick & Simpson,
Developmental Concepts in College Instruction [hereinafter Widick], in ENCOURAGING
DEVELOPMENT IN COLLEGE STUDENTS 27-59 (C. Parker ed. 1978) [hereinafter
ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT]. For a recent critical discussion of Perry's work, see
Kelly, Brown, & Foxx, Dialectics of Social ,4daptationand Individual Constructivism, 110
GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY MONOGRAPHS 257, 282-86 (1985); see also Ryan, Monitoring Text
Comprehension: Individual Differences in Epistemological Standards, 76 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOLOGY 248 (1984) (comparison of Perry's scheme to Benjamin Bloom's taxonomy of
various kinds of knowledge). Perry's own most recent work is a book review of a collection
of essays by European educational psychologists. Perry, Book Review, 56 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 187 (1986) [hereinafter Perry, Book Review].
33. Surprisingly, the work of David Hunt in this field has almost completely escaped
attention in the context of the development of young adults. For a recent discussion of
Hunt's work, see generally Khalili & Hood, A Longitudinal Study of Change in Conceptual
Level in College, 24 J. COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL 389 (1983) [hereinafter Khalili].
Hunt began his work by watching children as they progressed through Piaget's stages.
Gradually, Hunt expanded to include analysis of older children, adolescents, and young
adults. He eventually concluded that people develop by progressing through four levels.
At stage 0.0, children act in an essentially unsocialized fashion. They resist and avoid
external imposition. Ambiguity cannot be tolerated and information is processed in a very
simple and concrete manner. As children become adolescents, Hunt observed that they
gradually move to stage 1.0, in which they become concerned about socially acceptable
ideas and manners. More importantly, they increasingly begin to process information into
dichotomous categories such as right/wrong and good/bad. As these young people reach
later adolescence, another stage, 2.0 in Hunt's terminology, emerges. Here individuals
question and challenge absolutes and authority. They open themselves up to the ideas of
others. Their tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity increases. At this level, adolescents
realize the importance of interdependence between themselves and their environment.
Understanding of the self increases, as does willingness to accept imposition from the
outside. For discussions of Hunt's work, see generally D. HUNT & E. SULLIVAN,
BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION (1974); D. HUNT, MATCHING MODELS IN
EDUCATION:

THE

COORDINATION

OF

TEACHING

METHODS
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Perry's work, which is essentially unknown to legal educators, provides an extraordinarily perceptive psychological map
of law students. Perry discovered that young adults go through
nine sequential and distinct developmental stages. This discovery was, of course, pure Piaget. Perry then linked these nine
stages of young adult intellectual development to Dewey's ideas
about the ultimate uncertainty or relativism of all knowledge.34
An important cautionary point must immediately be made
about the following discussion. Most developmental psychologists believe, and most empirical data about college students
seems to demonstrate, that developmental change in adolescents
and young adults is ordinarily very gradual. College itself, for
example, causes most students to progress no more than about
one-half of a developmental step. 35 The following paragraphs
suggest that development for law school students, at least development along the Perry scale, might be quite rapid, perhaps even
an entire stage in a semester or two.
The first two positions in Perry's nine position developmental scheme involve a dualistic structure of knowledge, a dualism
frequently seen in law school students.36 The dualistic learner,
according to Carol Widick and Deborah Simpson,37 assumes
that all information can be classified as either right or wrong and
that uncertainty is an error of some sort. For the student at
these positions, 38 learning is a matter of finding and knowing
CHARACTERISTICS (1971); R. SPRINTHALL, supra note 32, at 411-515; Miller, Conceptual
Matching Models and InteractionalResearch in Education, 51 REV. EDUC. RES. 33 (1981).
34. Perry frequently discusses Piaget's work. See, e.g., W. PERRY, FORMS OF
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 201-06.

35. See Loevinger, Cohn, Redmore, Sargent, Streich, & Bonneville, Ego Development
in College, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 947 (1985) [hereinafter Loevinger,
College Ego Development]; see also J. LOEVINGER, PARADIGMS OF PERSONALITY (1987)
[hereinafter PARADIGMS]. See generally Schlaefli, Rest, & Thoma, Does Moral Education

Improve Moral Judgment? A Meta-Analysis of Intervention Studies Using the Defining
Issues Test, 55 REv. EDUC. RES. 319 (1985) [hereinafter Schlaefli]; Walker, de Vries, &
Bichard, The HierarchicalNature of Stages of Moral Development, 20 DE. PSYCHOLOGY

960 (1984) [hereinafter Walker].
36. Perry defines dualism as:
Division of meaning into two realms-Good versus Bad, Right versus Wrong,
We versus They, All that is not Success is Failure, and the like. Right Answers
exist somewhere for every problem, and authorities know them. Right Answers

are to be memorized by hard work. Knowledge is quantitative. Agency is
experienced as "out there" in Authority, test scores, the Right Job.
Perry, Cognitive and Ethical Growth, supra note 32, at 79.

37. Widick, supra note 32, at 27-59 (1978).
38. Position one is defined as:
The student sees the world in polar terms of we-right-good. vs. other-wrong-bad.
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right answers. Perry captures the essence of a student in position one in the following description.
Student A has always taken it for granted that knowledge consists of correct answers, that there is one right answer per problem, and that teachers explain these answers for students to
learn. He therefore39 listens for the [teacher] to state which theory he is to learn.
All legal educators have had countless experiences with Student
A in first year law school classrooms. In fact, sometimes it
seems that most students in such classrooms have an invisible A
burned into their foreheads. "[The] professor is lousy," these
law students often think. "He keeps giving us all this conflicting
stuff and won't tell us what we have to know."'' Only a small
dose of law school is needed, however, to move a student from
Perry's position one to his position two. Perry provides the following model of the position two student.
Student B makes the same general assumptions [as Student A]
but with an elaboration to the effect that teachers sometimes
present problems and procedures, rather than answers, "so that
we can learn to find the right answer on our own." He therefore perceives the [class] as a kind of guessing game in which he
is to "figure out" which theory is correct ....
Again, legal educators frequently encounter this kind of student.
"I know that [person] knows what I should do," these students
say repeatedly, "but she wants me to figure it out for myself. 4 2
It takes most law students only a few months to realize that
uncertainty and indeterminacy indeed do exist. This realization
leads them to ' Perry's
position three, the first of his positions of
"multiplicity. 43 According to Perry, students move to position
Right Answers for everything exist in the Absolute, known to Authority whose

role is to mediate (teach) them. Knowledge and goodness are perceived as
quantitative accretions of discrete rightnesses to be collected by hard work and
obedience (paradigm: a spelling test).
W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 9 (footnote omitted); see also id. at

59-72.
39. d at 1.
40. This is an actual student quotation from a work in developmental psychology.
Stonewater & Stonewater, Developmental Clues: An Aid for the Practitioner,21 NASPA J.
52, 55 (1983) [hereinafter Stonewater].
41. W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 1.
42. Stonewater, supra note 40, at 55.
43. Perry defines multiplicity as: "Diversity of opinion and values is recognized as
legitimate in areas where right answers are not yet known. Opinions remain atomistic
without pattern or system. No judgments can be made among them so 'everyone has a
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three when they accept "diversity and uncertainty as legitimate
but still temporary in areas where Authority 'hasn't found The
Answer yet.'"44 Emphasis here is on the words "temporary"
and "yet." The answer, though one exists, has not yet been
found. Law school is full of this. Open questions exist in law.
The law in a particular area is unsettled. Perhaps the clearest
example of position three reasoning in law school involves students' views of the courses themselves. Early in the first term,
for example, many law students come to accept confusion and
uncertainty. They do so, however, believing that the confusion
and uncertainty will be dissipated or even eliminated before the
end of the term. This belief, in turn, is reinforced by things these
first term students often hear from upperclassmen. "Don't
worry about the confusion," these students hear from their predecessors. "It will all come together for you at the end." For
these students, uncertainty is temporary; the answer has not yet
been found.
According to Perry, students gradually move away from a
dualistic view of knowledge and begin to think in a relativistic
fashion at position four.4 5 Position four is the second of Perry's
two positions of multiplicity. Recall that, at position three, students accept the existence of multiple answers, but view that
multiplicity as temporary. At position four, students realize that
some multiplicity is indeed permanent. Here emphasis is on the
word "some." Regarding some things, no answer exists, and
none ever will. In short, at position four relativistic thinking
exists as a special case, an isolated instance, permanent but limited in scope. This position includes what many psychologists
and philosophers call moral relativism, that is, a belief that on
ethical issues, although on no other issues, right answers do not
exist.
right to his own opinion; none can be called wrong.'" Perry, Cognitive and Ethical Growth,
supra note 32, at 79-80.
44. W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 9 (emphasis in original);
see also id. at 89-94.
45. (a) The student perceives legitimate uncertainty (and therefore diversity of
opinion) to be extensive and raises it to the status of an unstructured
epistemological realm of its own in which "anyone has a right to his own
opinion," a realm which he sets over against Authority's realm where rightwrong still prevails, or (b) the student discovers qualitative contextual relativistic
reasoning as a special case of "what They want" within Authority's realm.
W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 9; see also id. at 95-108. In his
1981 revision of the theory, Perry divides position 4 into two parts, namely 4a and 4b.
Perry, Cognitive and Ethical Growth, supra note 32, at 84-87.
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Law school provides many examples of position four reasoning. Quite commonly, for example, students describe a dramatic difference between several classes. "Thank goodness I
understand torts," these students cry out. "Contracts is hopeless. Nobody can figure out anything there!" Contracts is, in this
description, a special case, an anomaly. Furthermore, law students quickly learn that personal views on political, moral, ethical, and social policy matters differ quite widely. Everybody,
these students come to believe, has a right to his or her opinion
on these matters. In these contexts, no right answers exist.46
Again, emphasis is on the phrase "in these contexts." Relativistic thinking at position four is a special case. "That professor is
really clear on some stuff, but with some of the material, it seems
like she just hasn't figured it out yet." 47
Everything comes apart for young adults at position five,
according to Perry. Here students perceive "all knowledge and
values (including authority's) as contextual and relativistic. ' 48
Here students subordinate dualistic, right/wrong functions to
the status of a special case, in context. Uncertainty takes over
almost completely. In effect, at position five, position four is
reversed. Now, certainty is the rare special case, uncertainty the
norm. In position five, according to Widick and Simpson,
all knowledge is seen as contextual and relativistic; at this
point, concern with the nature of knowledge interacts with the
student's personal life. The student seems to generalize relativistic assumptions to the realm of self and is faced with many
vantage points from which to consider his or her own
identity. 49
Note carefully that this is not a description of moral relativism.
46. Readers familiar with Ronald Dworkin's work will find this particular studentheld view most troubling. See generally R. Dworkin, Is There Really No Right Answer in
Hard Cases?, in A MATTER

OF

PRINCIPLE 119 (1985).

47. Once again, this particular quotation is drawn from a developmental work and
not from a fictitious law student. Stonewater, supra note 40, at 55.
48. W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 9; see also id. at 109-33.

Perry defines relativism as follows:
Diversity of opinions, values, and judgment derived from coherent sources,
evidence, logics, systems, and patterns allowing for analysis and comparison.
Some opinions may be found worthless, while there remain matters about which
reasonable people will reasonably disagree. Knowledge is qualitative, dependent
on contexts.
Perry, Cognitive and Ethical Growth, supra note 32, at 80.
49. Widick, supra note 32, at 30.
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At this position, everything, scientific facts as well as moral
truths, is relative. Nothing can be known with certainty.
Perry is quite down to earth in his description of a position
five student. Note how this student's ideas about uncertainty
extend well beyond issues of morality.
Student C assumes that an answer can be called "right" only in
the light of its context, and that contexts or "frames of reference" differ. He assumes that several interpretations of a
poem, explanations of a historical development, or even theories of a class of events in physics may be legitimate "depending
on how you look at it." ... [H]e... supposes that the [teacher]

may be about to present three legitimate theories which can be
examined for their internal coherence, their scope, their fit with
various data, their predictive power, etc.5
A shock of recognition should now strike most legal educators.5" Perry's Student C is the model law student. Student C's,
or perhaps better said, multiplistic law students who are rapidly
moving toward a Student C perspective, get the top grades in
virtually all law school classes, edit the law reviews, win the
moot court competitions, and graduate with honors. They are,
it seems, what law teachers want all law students ultimately to
become. In fact, Perry's description of Student C is an essentially perfect description of a law student taught to think like a
lawyer.
Unlike legal educators, who seem to think of multiplicity or
relativism as the end of the developmental line, most developmental psychologists view these positions as merely intermediate
steps in the overall process of development. For example, Jane
Loevinger's ego development theory places the relativistic stage
of conscientiousness very near the middle of her multistage
sequence. 52 The same is true in the work of Broughton, 53 in that
50. W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 2.

51. Several writers on legal education have discussed the change that comes about in
law students in language that can be read through a Perry filter. For example, it is

common for legal education writers to note that law students come to see various sides of a
problem. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT AND EDUCATION 72-73 (1979); Erlanger

& Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional School: The Law School Experience and
Student Orientations to Public Interest Concerns, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 11, 30 (1978)
[hereinafter Erlanger].
52. J. LOEVINGER, EGO DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTIONS AND THEORIES 20-22, 2425 (1976). In her early work Loevinger frequently discusses Perry's ideas. See, e.g., id. at
126-33. She provides a chart showing how her various stages generally correspond to
Perry's. Id. at 109. See generally J. LOEVINGER, SCIENTIFIC WAYS IN THE STUDY OF
EGO DEVELOPMENT (1979). Recently, however, she seems to be moving away from Perry.
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of Labouvie-Veif, 54 in the writings of a group of psychologists
who believe that stages beyond Piaget's formal operations
exist,5 and in the 5reflective
judgment theory of Professors
6
King.
and
Kitchener
B.

Empirical Data on Law Students

Throughout this discussion of the first five positions in
Perry's nine position developmental scheme, references have
been made to anecdotal experiences seemingly representative of
those shared by many legal educators. Unfortunately, no formal

studies of law students' intellectual developmental have been
found that employ any of the now commonly used standardized
tests for evaluating the cognitive development of undergraduates. 7 Fortunately, however, a number of formal empirical
Currently, she suggests that little or no ego development occurs in the college years. See
Loevinger, College Ego Development, supra note 35.
53. Broughton, The Development of Concepts of Self Mind, Reality and Knowledge,
in NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT No. 1: SOCIAL COGNITION 75-100 (W.

Danner ed. 1978). Although Broughton's levels of development sound similar to Perry's,
Broughton seems to have been unfamiliar with Perry's work.
54. Labouvie-Vief, Dynamic Development and Mature Autonomy: A Theoretical
Prologue, 25 HUM. DEv. 161, 166 (1982).
55. BEYOND FORMAL OPERATIONS 217-38, 258-62, 320-25, 340-56 (M. Commons,
F. Richards, & C. Armon eds. 1984); see also BEYOND FORMAL OPERATIONS II:
COMPARISONS AND APPLICATIONS OF ADOLESCENT AND ADULT DEVELOPMENTAL

MODELS (M. Commons, J. Sinnott, F. Richards, & C. Armon eds., in press) [hereinafter
BEYOND FORMAL OPERATIONS II]; BEYOND FORMAL OPERATIONS III: MODELS AND
METHODS IN THE STUDY OF ADOLESCENT AND ADULT THOUGHT (in press) [hereinafter
BEYOND FORMAL OPERATIONS III].

56. See Kitchener & King, Reflective Judgment: Concepts of Justification and Their
Relationship to Age and Education, 2 1. APPLIED DEv. PSYCHOLOGY 89 (1981); see also

materials cited infra note 100.
57. For an example of one such standardized test, see the Scale of Intellectual
Development discussed in Erwin, The Scale of IntellectualDevelopment: MeasuringPerry's
Scheme, 24 J. COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL 6 passim (1983).

Another test is the

Measure of Epistemological Reflection, discussed in Baxter-Magolda & Porterfield, A New
Approach to Assess IntellectualDevelopment on the PerryScheme, 26 J. COLLEGE STUDENT
PERSONNEL 343 passim (1985), and yet another is the Measure of Intellectual Development
described in MEASURING STUDENT DEVELOPMENT 69-74 (G. Hanson ed. 1982). The

Reflective Judgement Interview is described in Kitchener & King, supra note 56, at 104-05,
and in Schmidt & Davison, Helping Students Think, 61 PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J. 563
(1983); see also D. WINTER, D. MCCLELLAND, & A. STEWART, A NEW CASE FOR THE
LIBERAL ARTS: ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL GOALS AND STUDENT DEVELOPMENT 27-36
(1981) (discussion of the Test of Thematic Analysis and the Analysis of Argument Test).

See generally Mines, Measurement Issues in EvaluatingStudent Development Programs,26
J. COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL 101 (1985).
These tests generally show that students graduate from college just as they begin
Perry's relativistic stage of development. A good review of the literature and a summary of
many studies is Brabek & Welfel, Counseling Theory: Understanding the Trend Toward
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studies have been conducted on law students which cast at least
indirect light on their intellectual development.
In one of the law student studies, Alfred Smith and his colleagues at the University of Texas apparently did not know of
Perry's work when they conducted a large scale study of the
thinking processes of almost one thousand first year law students. Smith, who published his results and conclusions as Cognitive Styles in Law Schools,"8 hypothesized that two distinct
styles of information processing exist, monopathic and
polypathic. Monopaths assume that there is a correct way to get
facts, to sort and interpret them, and to apply them. 59 The
monopath also thinks that the world is fundamentally unambiguous and changeless, a "stable, static, redundant world, with
nothing new under the sun ....,6o Smith's monopaths clearly
are Perry's dualistic thinkers. Conversely, Smith's polypaths
think the world has many possibilities, all of them ambiguous
and ever changing. The polypath's world is unpredictable,
changeable, dynamic, and indeterminate.6 a Clearly, Smith's
polypaths are either Perry's multiplistic or his relativistic thinkers. After reviewing all of his data, Smith concluded that first
year law students were somewhat more polypathic than the theoretical midpoint. However, a considerable number62 of students,
perhaps fully one-third of them, were monopathic.
Eclecticismfrom a Developmental Perspective, 63 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 343 (1985); see

also Brabek, Longitudinal Studies of Intellectual Development During Adulthood:
Theoretical and Research Models, 17 J. RES. & DEv. IN EDUc. 12 (1984) [hereinafter
Brabek, LongitudinalStudies]; Welfel & Davison, The Development of Reflective Judgment
During the College Years: A 4-Year Longitudinal Study, 27 J. COLLEGE STUDENT

PERSONNEL 209 (1986) (describing an as yet untested paper/pencil test). Data from a
college age sample evaluated in light of David Hunt's four step theory of intellectual
development is discussed in Khalili, supra note 33.

58. A. SMITH, COGNITIVE STYLES IN LAW SCHOOLS (1979).
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id.
62. Some of Smith's findings are a bit surprising. For example, Smith found that no
correlation existed between his measures of legalism and intolerance of ambiguity (these
measures being methods for differentiating between polypaths and monopaths), and Law
School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores. Furthermore, only a very tiny correlation existed,
and a positive one at that, between his authoritarianism measure and LSAT scores. High
LSAT scores correlated with high authoritarianism scores. In short, students with high
LSAT scores were not necessarily more polypathic than students with low LSAT scores.
Smith also discovered, again somewhat surprisingly, that first year students at widely
different types of law schools scored just about the same on all three of his measures.
Sampled schools ran from the highly regarded national law school at the University of
Michigan to the relatively unknown regional law school at the University of Detroit. On
the intolerance of ambiguity measure, no statistically significant difference existed between
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Another study of law school students generated similar
data. James Hedegard, who seems to have been unaware of both
Perry's and Smith's work, distributed to a large number of law
students the Course Perceptions Questionnaire (CPQ), which
sought information on how students evaluated many aspects of
their classes and teachers.63 One of the things measured by the
CPQ was classified on what Hedegard called the "right answer
index." 64 Students were asked to indicate whether their teachers
conveyed the sense that right answers to legal questions existed
or whether their teachers conveyed the sense that legal questions
had multiple legitimate answers. 65 Low scores on the CPQ's
right answer index, which indicated that right answers do not
exist, suggest that students perceive their teachers and themselves as thinking in what Perry would call multiplistic or relativistic patterns. Conversely, high scores on this index-right
answers do exist-suggest what Perry would call dualistic thinking. The mean score on Hedegard's index was 7.17 with 2 being
the lowest possible score (most relativistic) and 12 being the
highest (most dualistic). Actual scores ranged as low as four
and as high as ten. These law student scores confirm Alfred
students at national or regional schools. In addition, only a very small positive correlation
existed between the type of school attended-regional or national-and scores on the
authoritarianism and legalism measures. To be sure, students at national schools tended to
score somewhat lower on the legalism measure. However, at some of the regional schools
sampled, students had scores on this measure that were comparable to those of students at
the national schools. Furthermore, on the authoritarianism measure, students at one
national school scored quite high whereas students at another tended to score quite low.
Id. at 90-105.
63. Hedegard, The Course Perceptions Questionnaire: Development and Some Pilot
Research Findings, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 463 [hereinafter Hedegard, Course
Perceptions].
64. Id. at 474.
65. One of the questions used to create the right answer index was: "When... [the
instructor asks] a question in class, .. . [the instructor is]
- looking for a particular
right answer." The possible answers for the blank area were: nearly always, usually,
sometimes, infrequently, and almost never. Id. at 507 n.63. A second question used for the
same purpose was:
Some instructors treat their areas of law as though problems had definite, specific
solutions. Others treat their areas of law as though there are numerous problems,
each with desirable and undesirable features. Where, on this dimension, would
you place your emphasis?
Stress
specific
solutions

12 3 4 5 6 7

Stress
alternative
solutions

Id. at 530 n.43.
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Smith's previously described findings that a wide range of intellectual perspectives exist among law students.66
Two additional points must be made about Hedegard's
study. First, it and a related study conducted by Professors
Erlanger and Klegon 67 indicate that law school itself causes at
least some intellectual transformation in young adults. This
result is not surprising. These studies suggest that as students
move through law school, they rapidly develop an increased
ability to see various sides of an issue and increased tolerance for
66. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. Hedegard makes no attempt to
conceal his belief that students who think that no right answers exist have a better picture
of the world of law and legal education. Hedegard, Course Perceptions,supra note 63, at
514. Ronald Dworkin, however, might disagree. See generally Dworkin, supra note 46.
Because of Hedegard's clear bias, his data must be considered suspect.
Most students who have completed the first few weeks of law school speak the
language of multiplicity and relativism. They do so, in major part, because first year law
teachers spend inordinate amounts of time trying to rid students of dualistic-right/wrong,
good/bad-kinds of thinking. Dualistic speech is mocked in class. However, multiplistic
and relativistic talk by law students is often cheap. If pressed, many such students will
acknowledge that one argument or one perspective out of the many that have been
advanced or defended is in fact the right one. This perspective, the students insist, is the
better view or the modem rule. Of course, belief by law students that a better view or a
modem rule exists reflects dualistic thinking.
Such beliefs may also reflect, however, an even more troubling aspect of law school
learning. A vast number of right answers do exist in law. On many legal points, for
example, and in many jurisdictions, the law and the rules are completely settled. No
uncertainty exists on these points at all. Furthermore, a considerable portion of law school
training must involve the simple learning of these rules and laws. Roscoe Pound, a famous
legal theorist of the New Deal era, graphically made this point more than half a century
ago. "Kipling says that a sailor must know his ropes awake or asleep, drunk or sober. So
also a lawyer must know certain things no matter what his condition or what type of
professional activity he undertakes." Pound, What is a Good Legal Education?, 19
A.B.A.J. 627, 630 (1933). In a sense, therefore, law school requires dualistic thinking. Coexisting with this requirement of dualism for law students, however, is the overwhelmingly
multiplistic and relativistic manner of the process of legal analysis itself. As students learn
that process of analysis they see that every set of facts has two or more interpretations.
Every dispute, they learn, has more than one side. Every legal theory has a counter theory
and every policy a contradictory one. This is relativism in its essence.
Great stress frequently occurs for undergraduates as they make this transition. But
law school makes the transition even more difficult. Although law students must
constantly confront multiplicity and relativism, simultaneously they must retain some
aspects of dualism because many right answers exist in the law. In a sense, therefore, their
developing intellectual lives become schizophrenic. Many writers have commented about
the serious psychological problems encountered by law students. See generally, eg., Elkins,
Rites de Passage: Law Students Telling Their Lives, 35 J. LEGAL EDUc. 27 (1985)
[hereinafter Rites]. This essay contains virtually the only reference in the legal education
literature to William Perry's work. Unfortunately, the reference here is extremely brief.
Id. at 29. The essay itself, however, contains many fascinating excerpts from law students'
diaries.
67. See Erlanger, supra note 51.
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ambiguity. 68 In short, in Perry's terminology, law students show
rapid movement toward multiplicity and relativism. This finding seems to conflict with data developed at the undergraduate
level, which suggested that the movement between levels is very
slow. Second, as noted earlier in connection with anecdotal experience, Perry's relativistic thinkers seem to get the top grades in
law school. 69 Hedegard's data directly confirm this point. Hedegard, who compensated for LSAT scores, 70 discovered that a
direct positive correlation existed between low scores on the
right answer index (low scores indicating multiplistic or71relativistic thinking) and above average grades in law school.
C. Pain and Anxiety in Law Students
Perry bluntly says that the transition between dualistic and
relativistic thinking is the most difficult instructional moment
faced by students. 72 Thus, the foregoing observations about the
68. Id. at 30; Hedegard, supra note 63; see also Hedegard, Causes of Career-relevant
Interest Changes Among First-Year Law Students: Some Research Data, 1982 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 787, 817; Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education, 1979 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 791, 835-37.
69. See supra text following note 51.
70. Hedegard compared law students with similar LSAT scores in order to reduce the
LSAT variable. Hedegard, supra note 63, at 500-01.
71. Id. A complex study of almost 1000 law students done in the 1950s adds at least
some credence to this observation. Ramsey, A SubculturalApproach to Academic Behavior,
35 J. EDUC. Soc. 355 (1961). Ramsey placed law students in three clusters based on the
students' backgrounds. Cluster three, essentially a group of upper middle-class students,
had made relatively poor college grades, much worse, for example, than cluster one
students, who were hard-driving students from the middle and working classes. In law
school, however, despite the fact that cluster three students' grades remained below those
of cluster one students, the gap narrowed significantly. Ramsey suggests that this occurred
because cluster three students possessed greater flexibility in the manipulation of ideas, i.e.,
these students were more relativistic. Id. at 372. Another study of law students, Reich,
Strong Vocational Interest Blank Patterns Associated with Law School Achievement, 39
PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 1343 (1976), revealed that students who finished the first year of law
school in the top one-half of the class tended to favor professional or artistic occupations on
a standardized vocational test given to them before they began school. These occupations,
the study indicated, called for substantial flexibility in thinking. Students who finished the
year in the bottom half of the class in this study tended to favor business or commercial
occupations on the same test. These occupations, it was suggested, did not require a high
degree of flexibility.
72. W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 210; see also Perry,
Book Review, supra note 32, at 193.
Perry writes that teachers must interact with students moving toward relativism.
Though he is speaking of undergraduate teachers, his words have direct applicability for
legal educators.
Where knowledge consisted of facts in a single frame of reference, the teacher's
primary duties were to make the facts clear and to so correct his students in
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difficulty for law students of making the transition between dualistic and relativistic thinking cast a whole new light on one of the
most commonly observed and frequently discussed aspects of
modem legal education in the United States. Virtually every
discussion of law school learning eventually turns to descriptions
of the painful experience of the first months or year in law
school. "Anxiety, fear, pain, and suffering are part of legal education," writes James Elkins, a well-known legal educator.73
Law students are, he continues, "unhappy, dissatisfied, disaffected, disengaged, [and] alienated."'74
Professor Elkins frequently quotes law student diaries. His
students, who continually wrote about the pain of uncertainty in
law school, sound much like Perry's students.
Upon entering law school one finds that he cannot be so sure of
things anymore. To a new student it is a great big illusion. Law
school is another world....
When will the enlightment come? When will I be able to see
where all of this is taking me?
respect to the right and wrong of each fact as to allow of no error. The student, in
turn, collected correct facts and procedures. Where knowledge is contextual and
relative, the teacher's task is less atomistic as the student's is more integrational.
The good teacher becomes one who supports in his students a more sustained
groping, exploration, and synthesis. His acts of evaluation must subtend more
than discrete rights and wrongs, and extend through time to assist discrimination
among complex patterns of interpretation.
W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 211. Perry also describes what
can happen if teachers are not sufficiently aware of how their sudents are developing.
Again, Perry could easily have been talking about legal educators in this reference to a
senior undergraduate student who had been struggling terribly with an English course in
which the teacher insisted on belief in, of all things, relativism. Any attempt by the student
to take a position and defend it was met by the teacher's response that the argument was
over simplified. Perry's student said:
It seems to me that a great deal of success or a great deal that, that will determine
success, any factor that determines success must be the ability to take a position,
to articulate one side of one issue, because you can't-because it's foolish to, to
take both sides. It would destroy your position, no matter how much you sympathize or see. It seems to me that much that I've been forced to do here, this
taking of two sides at once, just suspends my judgment. There is value in it; of
course there's a value in, in seeing any perspective, or any particular facet of, of a
problem. But there's also a value in, in being able to articulate one side more than
another.
Id. at 141. Perry observes that the teacher had helped the student move to a relativistic
perspective but was thereafter blocking the student from making further development.
73. Elkins, Rites, supra note 66, at 28-29; see also Elkins, The Pedagogyof Ethics, 10
J. LEGAL PROF. 37 (1985) [hereinafter Elkins, Pedagogy].
74. Elkins, Rites, supra note 66, at 28.
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Nothing makes sense.75
As the semester draws nearer and nearer to a close, the pressure is becoming more and more unbearable. I can't understand why I'm so uneasy and scared. I don't feel like I know
anything. But I know that this can't be true.7 6
Law deals with the particular, not the general; the relative, not
the absolute ....
Other law students at the University of Wisconsin recorded sim-

ilar thoughts.
I haven't felt adequately prepared. I've gone over the material
but I just haven't felt prepared. I don't have command of the
material yet. . . . My undergraduate classes had right and
wrong answers; here there are several ways to look at a problem .... This is a little disturbing.
I really think that not knowing what's going on this whole [sixteen] weeks is really going to be rough. Psychologically, not
knowing that[,] you know it really tears you apart. You can be
intelligent and prepared but if you don't know that you are
prepared you go into a test pessimistically. You may not do
well on the exam because you are more scared than most other
people are, and you can't really be rational when you are
scared.... You really destroy motivation by this uncertainty.
I'll tell you the truth, honest to God, it's wearing me down....
I really don't have much confidence and it is really rough
'cause I don't know what I am doing.7"
Empirical studies of law students confirm the link between
pain and anxiety in law students, and Perry's description of the
pain of intellectual development. James Hedegard's data
revealed, for example, that a considerable increase in anxiety
levels and psychological distress occurred as students moved
through the first year in law school. 79 "This distress," Hedegard
wrote in words that could have been drawn directly from Perry's
writings, "may be an inevitable price for the serious questioning
of one's deeply ingrained beliefs, in law school or anywhere
75. Id. at 34.
76. Id. at 39.
77. Id. at 54.
78. Comment, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 1968 Wis. L. REv.
1201, 1206-07 (ellipses in original); see also Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA.
L. Rav. 551, 639-40 (1978) (study of a small number of students at Yale Law School).
79. Hedegard, supra note 68, at 835.
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Other psychologists8 1 and several legal educators have

made similar observations. Professor Watson, a psychiatrist and
a law school teacher, wrote that "[o]ne of the greatest sources of
anxiety in first year students is brought on by the shattering of
[the] illusion [of certainty] under the incessant attrition of case
method teaching.

' s2

Professor Patton, another law school

80. Id. at 865. Empirical data suggests that law students develop along similar
intellectual paths as other graduate students. See, e.g., Bratton, A Study of Dogmatism
Among Selected Professional Groups in Louisiana, 37(4-B) DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS
INT'L 1872 (1976) (lawyers in this small sample neither more nor less dogmatic than other
professionals); Lee, Communication and Cognition: Differences Among Students in
Journalism, Law and Business, 38(7-A) DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 37739 (1978)
(little difference in the tolerance of ambiguity by law, business, and journalism students).
One additional study deserves special mention here. It contains a cross-cultural study of
law students. Fouad, Hansen, & Arias-Galicia, Multiple DiscriminantAnalyses of CrossCultural Similarity of Vocational Interests of Lawyers and Engineers, 28 J. VOCATIONAL
BEHAV. 85 (1986). The interests of the student engineers were similar across culture. Not
so, however, with the student lawyers; dramatic differences existed.
81. A number of studies confirm the existence of stress in law students. The most
important of these, and perhaps the only one that contains empirically valid data, is
Benjamin, Kazniak, Sales, & Shanfield, The Role of Legal Education in Producing
PsychologicalDistressAmong Law Students andLawyers, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225.
This study suggests that stress in law students, which clearly exceeds stress in other
students, may be a function of excessive workloads, high student/faculty ratios, and the
denigration in law school of interpersonal skills. Id. at 248-51. Several of these studies
clearly indicate that stress is directly related to issues of uncertainty. In one such study,
Archer & Peters, Law Student Stress, 23 NASPA J. 48, 51 (1986), more than half of the
367 students in the study emphasized that lack of feedback regarding grades during the
semester produced the most stress. One-quarter of the students traced the stress to use of
the Socratic method. See also Heins, Fahey, & Leiden, Perceived Stress in Medical, Law
and Graduate Students, 59 J. MED. EDUC. 169 (1984). But see Hamilton, Pepitone,
Arreola, Rockwell, Rockwell, & Whitlow, Thirty-five Law Student Suicides, 11 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 335, 342 (1983) (suggesting that suicide rate for law students is lower
than the average population in the same age group); see also 0. MARU, RESEARCH ON THE
LEGAL PROFESSION: A REVIEW OF WORK DONE (2d ed. 1986) (contains references to
many of these studies); Beck & Bums, Anxiety and Depression in Law Students: Cognitive
Intervention, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 270 (1979); Dubin, The Role ofLaw School in Balancinga
Lawyer's Personaland Professional Life, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 57 (1982); Gutierrez,
supra note 24.
Antonia Abbey conducted a most interesting study that describes stress in law
students. Abbey, Dunkel-Schetter, & Brickman, Handling the Stress of Lookingfor a Job
in Law School: The Relationship Between Intrinsic Motivation, Internal Attributions,
Relations with Others, andHappiness, 4 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 263 (1983).
Abbey found that students with intrinsic motives for studying--that is, where activity is an
end in itself and has its own rewards-were considerably happier than students who
studied for extrinsic reasons such as career advancement or money. Abbey also noted in
this study something that she sensed at a workshop, although admittedly it did not show up
in the empirical data. Whereas many first year students were pursuing law for intrinsic
reasons, third year students focused only on living well and paying off loans. Id. at 274-76.
82. Watson, Reflections on the Teaching of CriminalLaw, 37 U. DET. L.J. 701, 703
(1960).
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teacher, reports similar findings.8 3 He asked law students to
think back about the first year in law school and remember what
stood out most in any way. The most frequent responses according to Patton were that students remembered being "confused,
afraid, [and] uncertain." 4 One of Professor Patton's students
said, "[I]t can make you feel quite lonely because you have nothing to grasp.... It's as if you are forced into quite a different
world and you have to... sort of learn to flounder again . "85
"..
Hedegard's comment about the price paid for serious questioning, "in law school or anywhere else,"'8 6 raises a crucially
important and intriguing point. The previously quoted law student statements8 7 about stress, as well as developmental theory
and empirical studies, suggest that much of the apparently endless discussion by legal educators about pain and anxiety in
beginning law students often misses the most important point.
Contrary to what many think, it may well be that the legal part
of legal education plays a far smaller role in causing anxiety and
pain in law students than does the education part. The education part of legal education, and not the legal part, forces students to move from dualistic to multiplistic and relativistic
thinking. Simultaneously, the education part of legal education
insists that students retain certain aspects of dualism. The pain
of lost certainty, the anxiety of indeterminacy, and the fear of
the unknowable, may not be unique to legal education. Rather,
this pain, anxiety, and fear may be a function of the developmental growth brought about by further education. Thus, any student who studies a subject taught in the same manner as law
may experience enormous intellectual pain.
D.

Beyond Relativism to... Commitment(?)

According to William Perry, the last four positions
nine stage cognitive development sequence of young
involve various stages of "Commitment. ' 88 These
advance students beyond the relativism of position five.

in the
adults
stages
Com-

83. Patton, The Student, the Situation and PerformanceDuring the First Year of Law

School, 21 J.

LEGAL EDUC.

10 (1968).

84. Id. at 27.
85. Id. at 17.

86. See supra text accompanying note 80.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78, 85.
88. W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 9-10, 134-53. Perry's

definition of "Commitment" is this: "(upper case C) An affirmation, choice, or decision
(career, values, politics, personal relationship) made in the awareness of Relativism
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mitments are affirmations. "[I]n all the plurality of the relativistic world.., one affirms what is one's own." 9 Vocation choices
are one area in which commitments provide a source of affirmation. "This year," a college junior told Perry, "I began to channel my thoughts more in line.... I guess nearer graduation I'm
more interested in what I'll do afterwards." 90 This student
continued:
I've done some thinking about what kind of law I'm going into,
and where I'm going to practice, and where I want to go to law
school. I'm not absolutely certain about that, but I'm fairly
certain I'm going into law and I'm very certain I'm going to
practice at home. But I'm not certain what kind of law I'm
going into. 91
Students initially apprehend the necessity of orienting
themselves in a relativistic world through some form of commitment at position six. 92 They do this because reason itself has

failed them.
The structures of Relativism... do provide, by definition, wide
opportunity for the exercise of reason.... But there is a limit.
In the end, reason itself remains reflexively relativistic, a property that turns reason back upon reason's own findings. In
even its farthest reaches, then, reason alone will leave the
thinker with several legitimate contexts and no way of choosing
among them-no way, at least, that he can justify through reason alone. If he then throws away reason entirely, he retreats
to the irresponsible in Multiplicity ("Anyone has a right to his
opinion"). If he is still to honor reason he must now also transcend it; he must affirm his own position from within himself in
full awareness that reason can never completely justify him or
assure him. In affirming his values, reason may help, but it will
not in itself convince him that these values are better than any
others; he must commit himself through his own faith....
(distinct from lowercase c of commitments never questioned). Agency is experienced as
within the individual." Perry, Cognitive and Ethical Growth, supra note 32, at 80.
Perry's ideas about commitment are similar to statements by philosophers who defend
the underlying idea of relativistic truth. Professor McCullagh has noted, for example, that
believing "that" is not possible because everything is not knowable. Believing "in,"
however, is a matter of trust. McCullagh, supra note 9, at 338.
89. W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 135.
90. Id at 141.
91. Id.
92. "The student apprehends the necessity of orienting himself in a relativistic world
through some form of personal Commitment (as distinct from unquestioned or
unconsidered commitment to simple belief in certainty)." W. PERRY, FORMS OF
DEVELOPMENT,

supra note 31, at 10. See generally id at 134-52.
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93
[Mie must commit himself or abrogate responsibility.
Perry's positions seven, eight, and nine involve a continuum
rather than distinct steps.94 At position seven, students actually
make an initial commitment in some area. 95 At position eight,
students experience the implications of commitment and explore
the subjective and stylistic issues of responsibility. Position nine
in Perry's scheme is a bit surrealistic. Here the student "experiences the affirmation of identity among multiple responsibilities
and realizes Commitment as an ongoing, unfolding activity
through which he expresses his life style."' 96 Stage
nine of com97
mitment concludes Perry's developmental cycle.
93. Id. at 135-36 (footnote omitted).
94. Id at 10; see also id. at 153-76.
95. Id at 10. This is different from position six, where students simply apprehend the
necessity of making a commitment. Id.
96. Id.
97. In a somewhat tongue-in-cheek manner, Perry summarizes his entire
developmental sequence in one of his short essays by saying that people make four
discoveries in life. When very young, children discover that there are authorities and that
those authorities know what they are doing. Teenagers make the second discovery, namely
that the authorities do not know what they are doing. College age students later discover
that nobody, including themselves, knows what is going on with any degree of certainty
and that reasonable people will differ enormously about virtually every important issue.
Finally, young adults make the fourth discovery that, despite uncertainty, life must
proceed. Therefore, choices must be made despite the inability to choose with certainty.
Perry, Sharingin the Costs of Growth, in ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 32, at
267-69 [hereinafter Perry, Sharing].
In his revision to the basic scheme, Perry provides the following detailed chart of the
various stages and of transitions between stages. This chart, of course, is somewhat more
complex than the four discoveries just described.
Position 1: Authorities know, and if we work hard, read every word, and learn
Right Answers, all will be well.
Transition: But what about those Others I hear about? And different opinions?
And Uncertainties? Some of our own Authorities disagree with each other or
don't seem to know, and some give us problems instead of Answers.
Position 2: True Authorities must be Right, the others are frauds. We remain
Right. Others must be different and Wrong. Good Authorities give us problems
so we can learn to find the Right Answer by our own independent thought.
Transition: But even Good Authorities admit they don't know all the answers
yet!
Position 3: Then some uncertainties and different opinions are real and legitimate
temporarily,even for Authorities. They're working on them to get to the Truth.
Transition: But there are so many things they don't know the Answers to! And
they won't for a long time.
Position 4a: Where Authorities don't know the Right Answers, everyone has a
right to his own opinion; no one is wrong!
Transition: But some of my friends ask me to support my opinions with facts and
reasons.
(and/or)
Transition: Then what right have They to grade us? About what?
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An important and controversial aspect of Perry's positions
six through nine must now be emphasized. All four of these
positions involve "commitment in relativism.

'9 8

Commitment

must occur, according to Perry, not because people come to
believe in the objective truth of ideas or principles, but because
no such objective truth exists. Life nevertheless must proceed. 99
The idea of commitment in relativism sets Perry quite distinctly apart from other theorists of cognitive development in
young adults. Most importantly, it sets him apart from Karen
Kitchener and Patricia King, the principal developers of the
important developmental theory of reflective judgment."
Position 4b: In certain courses Authorities are not asking for the Right Answer;
They want us to think about things in a certain way, supportingopinion with data.
That's what they grade us on.
Transition: But this "way" seems to work in most courses, and even outside
them.
Position 5: Then all thinking must be like this, even for Them. Everything is
relative but not equally valid. You have to understand how each context works.
Theories are not Truth but metaphors to interpret data with. You have to think
about your thinking.
Transition: But if everything is relative, am I relative too? How can I know I'm
making the Right Choice?
Position 6: I see I'm going to have to make my own decisions in an uncertain
world with no one to tell me I'm Right.
Transition: I'm lost if I don't. When I decide on my career (or marriage or
values) everything will straighten out.
Position 7: Well, I've made my first Commitment!
Transition: Why didn't that settle everything?
Position 8: I've made several commitments. I've got to balance them-how
many, how deep? How certain, how tentative?
Transition: Things are getting contradictory. I can't make logical sense out of
life's dilemmas.
Position 9: This is how life will be. I must be wholehearted while tentative, fight
for my values yet respect others, believe my deepest values right yet be ready to
learn. I see that I shall be retracing this whole journey over and over-but, I
hope, more wisely.
Perry, Cognitive and EthicalGrowth, supra note 32, at 79.
98. Perry, Cognitive and Ethical Growth, supra note 32, at 79.
99. James Boyd White, a well-known legal educator trained in both law and
literature, captured this idea perfectly in a watery metaphor. "When we discover that we
have in this world no earth or rock to stand upon but only shifting sea and sky and
wind . .. " White wrote, inadvertently echoing Perry's description of commitment in
relativism, "the mature response is not to lament the loss of fixity but to learn to sail." J.
WHITE, supra note 10, at 278. An exceptionally provocative review of White's book is
Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction (Book Review), 94
YALE L.J. 209 (1984).
100. See Kitchener & King, supra note 56. See generally King, Kitchener, & Wood,
The Development of Intellect and Character: A Longitudinal-Sequential Study of
Intellectual and Moral Development in Young Adults, 10 MORAL EDUC. F. 1 (1985);
Schmidt & Davison, HelpingStudents Think, 61 PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J. 563 (1983)
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Kitchener and King describe a seven stage developmental
sequence for young adults, the first four stages of which distinctly resemble Perry's first four positions of dualism and multiplicity. As Perry does, Kitchener and King put a stage of
relativism at the fifth position.101 The last two steps in the
Kitchener and King theory,10 2 however, dramatically differ from
the last four positions in Perry's developmental sequence, positions which he calls commitment in relativism. As the following
definition of Kitchener's and King's stage seven indicates, the
end of this developmental sequence involves belief in the existence of objective truth.
There is an objective reality against which ideas and assumptions must ultimately be tested. Despite the fact that our
knowledge of reality is subject to our own perceptions and
interpretations, it is nevertheless possible, through the process
of critical inquiry and evaluation, to determine that some judgments about that reality are more correct than other
(an excellent summary of the reflective judgment theory and a comparison of it to Perry's
scheme; also contains many helpful teaching suggestions). Several recent works by
Kitchener and King are currently in press. See, e.g., King, Kitchener, Wood, & Davison,
Relationships Across DevelopmentalDomains: A LongitudinalStudy of Intellectual, Moral
and Ego Development, in BEYOND FORMAL OPERATIONS II, supra note 55; Kitchener &

King, The Reflective Judgment Model. Ten Years of Research, in

BEYOND FORMAL

OPERATIONS III, supra note 55.

101. The following chart describes the first five stages in the Kitchener and King
system. The chart is drawn from Brabek, Longitudinal Studies, supra note 57, at 19-20.
Assumptions [A]bout Reality
[Stage I-] There is an objective reality which exists as the individual sees it.
Reality and knowledge about reality are identical and known absolutely through
the individual's perceptions.
[Stage 2:] There is an objective reality which is knowable and known by someone.
[Stage 3:] There is an objective reality, but it cannot always be immediately
known, even to legitimate authorities. It is possible to attain knowledge about
this reality, but our full knowledge of it is as yet incomplete and therefore
uncertain.
[Stage 4:] There is an objective reality, but it can never be known without
uncertainty. Neither authorities, time or money[,] nor a quantity of evidence can
be relied upon to [lead ultimately] to absolute knowledge.
[Stage 5:] An objective understanding of reality is not possible since objective
knowledge does not exist. Reality exists only subjectively and what is known of
reality reflects a strictly personal knowledge. Since objective reality does not
exist, an objective understanding of reality is not possible.
102. Professor Brabek provides this definition of the Kitchener and King stage six:
"An objective understanding of reality is not possible since our knowledge of reality is
subject to our own perceptions and interpretations. However, some judgments about
reality may be evaluated as more rational or based on stronger evidence than other
judgments." Id. at 20.
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judgments." °3
In short, absolutely contradicting the essence of Perry's underlying epistemological stance, Kitchener and King believe that cognitive development in young adults ultimately moves toward
belief in the existence of objective truth.'04
103. Id.
104. In a fascinating recent study, Seymour Epstein and Nancy Erskine noted that
the process of personal development in human beings resembles the process of development
in scientific theories. Epstein & Erskine, The Development of Personal Theories of Reality
from an Interactional Perspective, in D. MAGNUSSON & V. ALLEN, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERACTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 133-46 (1983). In a tour de force,
these psychologists compare William Perry's scheme of intellectual development to
Thomas Kuhn's analysis of the process of scientific invention. Both of these theories,
according to Epstein and Erskine, put acceptance of relativism at center stage. Scientists in
a particular era, according to Kuhn, tend to share a common paradigm that consists of a
theory or model for interpreting data and conducting research. As long as there is an
accepted working model, scientists can go about normal science. This aspect of the
scientific process runs parallel to Perry's picture of dualistic thinking. Everything here fits
comfortably into a pattern or paradigm. Scientific discovery occurs, however, according to
Kuhn, as the controlling paradigm stimulates new research. Anomalies are uncovered that
cannot be assimilated. Gradually the paradigm breaks down. Before it breaks down
completely, however, scientists make desperate attempts to shore it up. This stage of
scientific discovery, according to Epstein and Erskine, closely resembles Perry's stages of
multiplicity. Kuhn notes that the period after the breakdown of a paradigm consists of
random, unfocused scientific efforts. During such periods, scientists feel enormous pain,
anxiety, and despair. In short, scientists go through Perry's period of relativism.
Perry himself said something similar in his most recent essay. Perry, Book Review,
supra note 32. He noted that the process of developing developmental theories is like the
process of psychological development itself. Initially, he and others thought of
development in static and dichotomous terms. In a sense, he acknowledges, this was
dualistic thinking. Now, however, psychologists think of development in a contextual and
relativistic fashion.
That professors and theorists should be caught up in something like dualistic thinking
should not be surprising. In fact, an interesting empirical study indicates that substantial
numbers of university teachers think dualistically. In a fascinating book, ACADEMIC
CULTURE AND FACULTY DEVELOPMENT (1979), Mervin Freedman analyzed college
faculty in light of William Perry's developmental scheme. Freedman and his colleagues
interviewed 91 faculty members at a large state university. The interviews covered such
matters as the process of education, the nature of knowledge, and the teachers' own
philosophy of teaching. Freedman identified five stages of faculty development, stages
which closely track Perry's nine positions.
Freedman found 9% of his overall faculty sample to be at stage 1. (Interestingly,
Group II of the sample, which consisted of "Natural Science and Professional-Applied"
teachers, came in higher, at 11%.) "Knowledge is seen," Freedman says of these stage one
faculty members, "in absolute terms, as unproblematic facts." Id. at 97.
Their view[s] of students, grading procedures and the like are relatively
undifferentiated. There are right and wrong procedures and judgements, and they
may be easily catalogued. Grading reflects the degree to which students know
right from wrong information. Their opinions are rather dogmatic and are
distinguished by their lack of complexity, and their presentation tends to preclude
argument and alternative points of view. For this kind of professor the world is
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Commitment in Law Schools?

Regardless of whether one accepts Kitchener's and King's
view of the existence of objective truth or Perry's view of the
divided into areas of good and bad by some authority, usually a particular
reference group.

i d Moving to the next developmental stage, Freedman put 21% of his faculty sample into
stage 2. (Fully 43% of the natural science and professional-applied teachers fit in here.)
Freedman notes that teachers at stage two have increased distance vis-a-vis stage one teachers from conventional reference groups. For these teachers, knowledge is more complex.
Although the aim continues to be the acquisition of facts by students, these
faculty members are interested in helpful techniques. The nature and source of
knowledge are clear, but one must find the right methods for presenting them.
They still see people in monolithic good and bad terms, but now they are willing
to try to explain their behavior-usually in terms of simple causal relationshipsfor example, between behavior and social class or behavior and childhood experience. These professors have had some experience with diverse opinions, with
views contrary to their own, and so they articulate their situation better.
Id. at 98. "Nonetheless," Freedman states about this second group of faculty, "the certainty of right action as derived from authority is never in doubt." Id. Freedman found
that about one-third of the university teachers in his sample were at his two relativistic
stages in the developmental sequence. At his stage three, teachers have an "appreciation of
human variousness." Id. At stage four, teachers have a sense of freedom and relativity in
social roles. Furthermore, these stage four teachers really see things from the student's
side. Id. at 98-99. Stage 5 faculty in Freedman's analysis, the stage which corresponds to
Perry's post-relativism stages of commitment in relativism, garnered only about 26% of the
sampled faculty.
In THE UNIVERSITY TEACHER AS ARTIST, infra note 168, Joseph Axelrod picks up
where Freedman's data leave off. In this extraordinary book, Axelrod attempts to describe
what it is that makes up good teaching in higher education. To do this he draws portraits
of four prototypical teachers. Beginning with what he calls the principles and facts prototype, Axelrod moves on to describe the instructor-centered teacher. Both of these prototypes seem related to Freedman's stage one and two dualistic faculty members. Axelrod's
description of the student-as-mind prototype follows, which links this prototype to Freedman's relativistic teachers. Axelrod calls his final prototype the student-as-person teacher.
In a crucial passage Axelrod describes the difference between these last two prototypes. As
he does so, he graphically paints a picture of a Freedman stage five teacher.
Professor Persey [the student-as-person prototype] and Professor Minter [the student-as-mind prototype] share a fundamental assumption. They both believe that
a teaching philosophy must be grounded in a theory of human development, a
theory of how human beings achieve their fullest powers of humanity. Each
defines humanness in his own way. Professor Minter, as we have seen, defines it
in terms of rational development; he believes that a university can and ought to
keep the two developmental cycles in the student separate-progress in academic
matters on the one hand, and progress in matters of student life on the other.
Professor Persey defines humanness in terms of the whole person; he believes that
the two cycles should not be kept separate, that each cycle should work to support the other. He believes, further, that it is the responsibility of every faculty
member to help in that process.
Id. at 32-33. Professor Axelrod notes that Professor Persey, the student-as-person prototype, uses many different techniques for developing students' humanness. One of the most
effective of such techniques involves insisting that students discuss their classwork with
nonclass friends. The reasons given for using this particular technique should have a familHeinOnline -- 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1265 1987-1988
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necessity for commitment in relativism because of the nonexistence of objective truth, one fact can scarcely be disputed. Law
school education appears essentially devoid of any emphasis on
ideas like commitment, personal values, or feelings.10 5 Scott
Turow, who described his first year as a law student at Harvard
in an important book,10 6 puts this point best. "Too much of
what goes on around the law school and in the legal classroom
seeks to tutor students in strategies for avoiding, for ignoring, for
somehow subverting the unquantifiable, the inexact, the emotionally charged, those things which still pass in my mind under
the label 'human.' "107 Turow quotes another law student's
reaction to a fourth week argument in class that had almost
completely avoided emotional appeals or personal feelings. "I
don't care," said this woman to Turow,
if [the teacher] doesn't want to know how I feel ....I feel a lot
of things ...and they have everything to do with the way I
think ...I don't want to become the kind of person who tries
to pretend that my feelings have1 08nothing to do with my opinions. It's not bad to feel things.
This classmate and others, said Turow, felt that they were being
"cut away from themselves" by law school. 10 9
James Elkins' law students at West Virginia also found
themselves being cut away from an important part of
themselves. 110
Law school is not the ultimate. I have always wanted to be a
lawyer but that is not all. I am here only to get some tools.
Law will not be my life. I may practice law to make a living
but I will not live it. 11'
iar ring to readers familiar with Perry's descriptions of the post-relativism stages of young
adult development.
When a student takes the initiative and starts a discussion at home about a novel
he's reading for my class, something subtle happens to him. He makes a commitment. Assuming, of course, that he sparks some interest in his mother or father

or wife or girl friend-then he is making a commitment that goes way beyond his
commitment to me. He commits himself to the book at hand, and he commits
himself to literature.

Id. at 35-36.
105. See generally the leading article on this point, Stone, Legal Education on the
Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1971).
106. S.TUROW, ONE L (1977).
107. Id. at 297.

108. Id. at 92.
109. Id.
110. See Elkins, Rites, supra note 66, at 32-41; Elkins, Pedagogy,supra note 73, at 48.
111. Elkins, Rites, supra note 66, at 49.
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I am simply unwilling to submit to a lifetime which is dominated by the pettiness and soulless contempt for human feeling
that is so rampant in law school. If legal practice is like law
school, I'll do something else. There is a time to walk away
from things. No matter how much you have invested, or how
hard you work to get where you are at [sic], there comes a
times [sic] when the game is no longer worth the candle and the
sorrow you feel in giving up is infinitely
less than the pain from
1 12
going on. It's like peace with honor.
We are so willing to sacrifice ourselves, our values-to become
a person [of] whose characteristics we are as yet unaware. The
mere fact that we don't know where our professional development is leading us does not stop us from advancing full speed.
Rather than harmlessly spinning our wheels, we are driving at
breakneck speed over
unfamiliar and dangerous roads. I fear
13
there is no return.'
Somewhat surprisingly, empirical studies of law students do
not directly confirm the representativeness of the individual
experiences just described. Formal empirical studies by Hedegard, 11 4 Erlanger and Klegon,115 Katz and Denbeaux,11 6 and
Thielens,1 17 for example, indicate that essentially no change
occurs in law students' levels of ethics or cynicism as a result of
law school. A related study by Stark, Tegeler, and Channels
provides similar results.11 8 To be sure, Pipkin, Stokes, and Spangler found data to support the hypothesis that law school
reduced students' sense of idealism and increased their level of
cynicism.1 19 Pipkin later backed away from his earlier observations and suggested that law "students' ethical and attitudinal
112. Id. at 50. The student who wrote these words was a veteran of the war in

Vietnam.
113. Id. at 52.
114. See supra note 68.
115. See Erlanger, supra note 51.

116. See Katz & Denbeaux, Aleration or Elaboration: Does Law School Instill
Cynicism?, unpublished manuscript discussed in American Bar Association, Law Schools
and ProfessionalEducation: Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee for a

Study of Legal Education of the American Bar Association 32 (1980) [hereinafter ABA,
Report].
117. See Thielens, The Influence of the Law School Experience on the Professional
Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL EDuC. 587 (1969).

118. See Stark, Tegeler, & Channels, The Effect of Student Values on Lawyering
Performance: An Empirical Response to Professor Condlin, 37 J. LEGAL EDuc. 409 (1987)

[hereinafter Stark].
119. Pipkin, Stokes, & Spangler, Contingencies in the Development of Cynicism
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dispositions are largely impervious to legal education." 120 Perhaps, however, Pipkin and these other researchers spoke too
soon, or somehow conducted studies that did not tap the reservoir of resentment that Scott Turow 12' and other law students
describe.
Some evidence for the latter possibility exists. In a recent
study, Audrey Schwartz discovered that seven months in law
school significantly decreased law students' likelihood of wanting to work for social change. The environment of law school,
22
she concludes, is not conducive to significant socialization.1
Paul Miller describes an empirical study that he conducted in
the 1960s in an attempt to discover why some law students drop
out of law school. 123 Miller employed the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator (MBTI), a commonly used psychological test for
determining personality types. 124 Among many other things
that it can do, the MBTI can classify people as thinking or feeling types. Feeling types, about 50% of undergraduate students,
tend to emphasize personal values and commitments. Conversely, thinking types, again about 50% of the undergraduate
total, tend to favor analysis and reason. Miller administered the
MBTI to a large group of law students at four different schools.
He discovered that thinking types were significantly overrepresented in law school (74%) in relation to the overall underAmong Law Students, (1976), unpublished manuscript discussed in ABA, Report, supra

note 116, at 69.
120. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Curricular
Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247, 267 (footnote omitted).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 106-09.

122. Schwartz, The Paper Chase Myth: Law Students in the 1970"s, 28 Soc.
PERSPECTIVES 87 (1985).
123. Miller, PersonalityDifferences and Student Survival in Law School, 19J. LEGAL

EDuc. 460 (1967); see also Chretien & Chretien, ReconsideringNon-TraditionalFactorsin
Law School Admissions, 11 S.U.L. REv. 31, 35-39 (1985) (particularly in reference to the
study by Hills and Raine).
124. The MBTI has also been used to gather as yet unpublished data about other
people in the legal profession. See G. MACDAID, M. MCCAULLEY, & R. KAINz, ATLAS OF

TYPE TABLES (in press) (copy on file with author). Lawyers and judges who have been
scored on the MBTI tend to fall into patterns similar to law students. See also Phillips,
Entrepreneursin Law: A PersonalityPerspective (1984), unpublished manuscript available

from the Center for Applications of Psychological Type, Gainesville, Florida (copy on file
with author).
An important aspect of the MBTI and of cognitive type theory in general must now be
noted. Type theorists believe that personality type is an inherent characteristic of human
beings, similar in a sense to a person's fingerprints. It does not change. This idea, of
course, is diametrically opposed to fundamental aspects of developmental theory.
Developmental theorists argue that massive changes and developments occur in a person's

personality as a function of intellectual and moral growth.
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graduate population (54%). More importantly, Miller found
that a significant correlation existed between personality type
and dropping out of law school. Feeling types were considerably
more likely to drop out of law school than thinking types. In
fact, of the thinking type students identified by the MBTI as
dependable and practical with a realistic respect for facts, who
absorb and remember great numbers of facts, and who emphasize analysis, logic, and decisiveness, only 6.7% dropped out of
law school. 125 However, of the feeling type students identified by
the MBTI as "concerned chiefly with people, who [value] harmonious human contacts, [and who are] friendly, tactful, sympathetic, and loyal," 126 fully 28% dropped out of school. Miller's
data clearly suggest that feeling type students, that is, students
interested in personal
values and commitments, find little sup127
port in law school.
To be sure, only a handful of students drop out of law
school because of its unfriendliness toward feelings, values, and
commitments. Another empirical study, however, suggests that
even those law students who remain in school and eventually
graduate may ultimately pay a serious price for the law school
environment's denigration of these intangible, emotion-based
ideas. In a recent study of lawyers' mechanisms for coping with
stress, Suzanne Kobasa discovered, somewhat to her surprise,
that the lawyers who best deal with stress are those who have the
greatest sense of personal commitment. 128 "Commitment," she
writes, "is defined as the ability to believe in the truth, importance, and interest value of what one is doing."' 129 Kobasa also
concluded that alienated lawyers, that is, lawyers who possess
feelings that are the opposite of commitment, "feel apathetic and
125. Miller, supra note 123, at 466.
126. Id.
127. Another group of law students, or, perhaps better said, the same group of

students differently described, may also suffer extraordinary consequences. As noted
earlier, Professor Ramsey has grouped law students into three clusters. See Ramsey, supra
note 71. Cluster two students, a small group not earlier described, are still developing,
seeking, and realizing their potentialities. Their final values are not yet crystallized. These

students' search for a new identity in the endless law school mirage of uncertain values,
according to Ramsey, may sow the seeds of "cultural schizophrenia." Id. at 370. Ramsey
also uses a metaphor similar to those used throughout this Article. "Outwardly calm
waters of casualness and studied carelessness frequently belie tempests underneath." Id.
128. Kobasa, Commitment and Coping in Stress Resistance Among Lawyers, 42 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 707 (1982).

129. Id. at 708.
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1 30

"Escape" and the Adversary System

Notwithstanding the severe damage to developing students
that can be done in law school by the failure of legal educators
generally to address issues of values, feelings, and commitments, 131 an even more dangerous, cognitive developmental trap
may exist for law students. According to William Perry, arrival
by young adults at the stages of multiplicity and relativism does
not automatically generate onward movement toward commitment. Arrival
at that stage, Perry believes, can also lead to
"escape. ' 132 Escape is, in effect, a backward movement on the
developmental scale. It is also, to use a word employed by both
Perry and Suzanne Kobasa, a form of alienation. Escape occurs
when a student exploits the opportunity for detachment offered
by Perry's relativistic positions four and five and thereafter
denies responsibility for making important intellectual decisions.
One of the most dangerous forms of escape, Perry believes,
is "escape into commitment."1 3 3 Here commitment is sought as
an escape from development, not as a forward step. Commitment here reflects a desire to return to dualistic thinking. "The
hope seems to be," Perry writes, "that through intensity of
focus, all ambivalences will be magically resolved." 134 In connection with his discussion of escape into commitment, Perry
quotes an undergraduate student who sounds like countless law
students.
If I could find something that I really liked-ah, take some
interest in my courses-I enjoy doing them, but I really don't
get into them, like, say, I'd get into a football game. If I could
get into a course like that, and enjoy it, I think that's the thing
I'd want to stay with the rest of my life. That's what I'm looking for. Maybe I'll have to make myself feel that way, I don't
130. Id.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 105-30.
132. W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 177-200. Perry's

thumbnail

definition of escape is:

"Alienation,

abandonment

of responsibility.

Exploitation of Multiplicity and Relativism for avoidance of Commitment." Perry,
Cognitive and Ethical Growth, supra note 32, at 80; see also id. at 91-92. Interestingly, other
psychologists have also detected evidence of backward movement along developmental

lines. See, e.g., Loevinger, College Ego Development, supra note 35. See also generally E.
FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941); E. HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS
ON THE NATURE OF MASS MOVEMENTS (1951).

133. W. PERRY, FORMS OF DEVELOPMENT, supra note 31, at 196.
134. Id.
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Another of Perry's students brings home the escape point even
better. "The only people I know who are successes are people
who really throw themselves completely into what they're
doing." 36' This student was talking about law students.
One aspect of American legal education, or, better said, one
aspect of the American legal system, deserves special mention in
the context of Perry's developmental idea of escape into commitment. The adversarial system of justice is at the heart of virtually all lawyering practice in the United States. According to
the theory of this system, the clash of adversaries produces truth
and justice.1 37 Since that is so, lawyers in an adversarial system
do everything possible, within the confines of rules of professional conduct, to advance their own clients' positions. An
independent third party ultimately evaluates both sides' arguments and then decides the issues. Given the nature of the
adversarial system, individual lawyers practicing within its confines have no direct responsibility personally to seek truth and
justice. The system itself, rather than the individual lawyers,
bears that responsibility.
In a recent essay, Anthony Kronman, one of modem legal
education's most thoughtful writers, inadvertently explored the
problem just described. 38 Kronman describes how law school
itself can encourage escape from intellectual development.
The indifference to truth that all advocacy entails is likely,
it seems to me, to affect the character of one who practices the
craft for a long time and in a studied way. Because it requires
its practitioner to think of truth as, at most, an instrumental
good, not as something valued for its own sake, advocacy
encourages what can only be described as a kind of cynicism
regarding efforts to discover and to state the truth about the
wide range of human matters with which the law is concerned.
I believe that the process of becoming an advocate is likely to
make someone more cynical about truth-seeking: not, of
135. Id. at 196-97.
136. Id. at 197.
137. A number of studies have been conducted of the truth-determining efficacy of
the adversarial system. Several of these studies are described in Sheppard & Vidmar,
Adversary Pre-trialProcedures and Testimonial Evidence: Effects of Lawyer's Role and
Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 320 (1980). A somewhat
different approach is taken in Stark, supra note 118. These writers think that the reaction
to the adversary system may be a function of individual personality traits. Id. at 419-20.
138. Kronman, Foreward: Legal Scholarshipand MoralEducation, 90 YALE L.J. 955
(1981).
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course, about all forms of truth-seeking, since there is no reason to think that a training in advocacy changes anyone's
beliefs about, say, the efforts of physicists and astronomers to
understand the structure of the physical world; but more cynical about attempts to discover the truth concerning the manifold forms of human conduct that the law, in one way or
another, purports to regulate. By "cynicism" I mean an attitude that questions the worth of such attempts to discover the
truth and is inclined to see them as pointless exercises that cannot be justified by any genuine or respectable human need. The
cynicism of the advocate is not the product of his having
attempted to discover the truth about human affairs and failed;
rather, it is the product of his having become accustomed to
disregard the question of truthfulness as irrelevant to the practice of his craft. It is easy to believe that efforts to state the
truth about man's moral and social life are illusory and vain;
the professional attitude of the advocate, as it hardens into139a
habit, tends to confirm this belief and to augment its power.

For Perry, commitment in relativism, rather than escape
into commitment, signals the way past relativism. "[Y]ou have
to operate within a certain set of rules, a certain set of principles," a junior student told Perry, after acknowledging that
nothing could be known with any certainty,
or you're going to lose your self-respect. You still have to rec-

ognize that all these things that you learn, all these odd things
about yourself and other people are potential tools for destruction or construction, and that you've got to be very careful in
the way you utilize each one of them. They are things that you,
that's one way of perceiving them, that you are, you are capable of using them. You don't go around turning on compassion
and turning it off like a water faucet. You, you can use it. People ... people just aren't conscious enough of their roles, that's

all. They don't, don't try. There's such a thing as being too
self-conscious, but, but you've got to be able to see the effects
you're having on other people, and the effect other people have
on you. And you've got to be careful about how you use all
these things you've developed. And most people aren't. I'm
certainly not careful about how I use things, but a recognition
of your own qualities and what effect they can have on other
139. Id. at 964-65. Kronman's thought that cynicism about the truth-seeking efforts
of astronomers and physicists may not develop in law students raises a troubling issue. In
light of the progress of modem science, and in light of the work of Thomas Kuhn and
Michael Polanyi in connection with modem debates in the philosophy of science, cynicism
and skepticism about just those things might also appropriately develop. See supra notes 4
& 7.
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people is very important."4

Note carefully an important but subtle aspect of the words
just quoted. This student clearly was speaking of something far
different than intellectual development alone. This student has
connected intellectual growth and moral growth.

II.

STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN YOUNG ADULTS

Elaborate developmental theories have been proposed in
recent years to explain moral as well as intellectual growth in
young adults.14 Without doubt, Lawrence Kohlberg's pioneering work in this area has had the greatest general impact.
Kohlberg's ideas have been so far-reaching that even some legal
educators have discussed them, albeit usually in a rather superficial manner.14 2 Considerably less well-known to legal educators
than Kohlberg's work, however, is other work in the field of
moral development. For example, only a few law school profes-

sors have written about the moral development work of Carole
Gilligan, 143 and then virtually always in the context of feminist

theories. Moreover, Norma Haan's recent attempt to find common ground between Kohlberg's ideas and Gilligan's has com-

pletely escaped attention in the legal education literature.144
140. W.

PERRY,

FORMS OF

DEVELOPMENT,

supra note 31, at 161 (ellipsis in

original).
141. The following works, particularly the first one, are excellent starting points for
analysis in this context. See Miller, Ways of MoralLearning,94 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 507
(1985). Miller, a philosopher, provides a very readable guide to various theories of moral
development in the fields of philosophy, anthropology, and developmental psychology.
Perhaps the best recent summaries of the psychological literature are J. RICH, supra note
32; and R. HERSH, J. MILLER, & G. FIELDING, MODELS OF MORAL EDUCATION: AN

(1980) [hereinafter R. HERSH], with this later work being the stronger one but
a bit dated. See also H. ROSEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOMORAL KNOWLEDGE
APPRAISAL

(1980) (puts the literature of developmental psychology into a larger context); M.
CHILDREN,

PARENTHOOD

AND

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

SOCIAL

18-44 (1985)

WELFARE

IN

THE

SIEGAL,
CONTEXT
OF

(same).

142. See, e.g., Dickinson, Moral Development Theory and Clinical Legal Education:
The Development of Professional Identity, 22 U.W. ONTARIO L. REV. 183 (1984).
Dickinson's article is the only work in the legal education literature that discusses both
Perry and Kohlberg. Unfortunately, most of the treatments of Kohiberg's work in the
legal education literature are quite dated. See, e.g., Richards, Moral Theory, the
Developmental Psychology of EthicalAutonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC.
359 (1981) (cites none of Kohlberg's post-1973 work).
143. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a

Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY

WOMEN'S

L.J. 39 (1985).

144. See infra text accompanying notes 169-192.
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Lawrence Kohlberg and the Stages of Moral Development

After many years of interviewing adolescents and young
adults, Lawrence Kohlberg 145 theorized that moral growth or
46
development occurs in a series of six sequential stages or steps.
This is, of course, pure Piaget. Kohlberg describes his moral
development system's stages one and two as preconventional
moral reasoning, his stages three and four as conventional moral
reasoning, and his stages five and six as postconventional.
Kohlberg, like Piaget, insists that the sequence is invariant, that
people must go through each individual level before reaching the
next, and that movement is always upward. 147
There seems to be widespread agreement among psychologists who study moral development, with the exception of Jane
Loevinger, 148 that higher education promotes at least some
upward movement in the moral development of young adults.X49
Admittedly, however, that upward movement is probably quite
small. Furthermore, standardized tests of moral development,
145. See generally 1 L. KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT:

THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981); 2 L. KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL

DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984); Colby, Kohlberg,
Gibbs, & Lieberman, A LongitudinalStudy of Moral Judgment, in 48 MONOGRAPHS SOC'Y
RES. CHILD DEv. (1983) [hereinafter Colby]; Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization:
The Cognitive-Developmental Approach, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR:
THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES (T. Lickona ed. 1976). Excellent secondary
discussions of Kohlberg's work can be found in R. HERSH, supra note 141; MORAL
DEVELOPMENT, MORAL EDUCATION AND KOHLBERG (B. Munsey ed. 1980); J. REIMER,
D. PAOLrrrO, & R. HERSH, PROMOTING MORAL GROWTH (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter J.
REIMER]; J. RICH, supra note 32, at 87-98; R. SPRINTHALL, supra note 32.
146. Kohlberg was heavily influenced by the writings of William Perry. 1 L.
KOHLBERG, supra note 145, at 398-99, 409-12, 432.
147. This summary was drawn directly from R. HERSH, supra note 141, at 120-26.
148. See Loevinger, College Ego Development, supra note 35; see also J. LOEVINGER,
PARADIGMS, supra note 35. Loevinger believes that only minimal movement occurs.
149. See generally Schlaefli, supra note 35; Walker, supra note 35; Kitchener,
LongitudinalStudy, supra note 35.
A number of books contain useful discussions about how teachers can promote moral
growth. See R. HERSH, supra note 141, at 135-49 (an outstanding step by step approach);
MORAL EDUCATION: THEORY AND APPLICATION (M. Berkowitz & F. Oser eds. 1985)
[hereinafter MORAL EDUCATION]; J. REIMER, supra note 145; R. SPRINTHALL, supra note
32, at 362-67, 409-15.
Much of the debate in the literature describing methods for promoting moral
development revolves around what is usually called the plus one idea. Kohlberg originally
believed that teachers should confront students with issues at a stage equal to the students'
own, plus one. Although Kohlberg has moved away from that teaching idea somewhat in
his later work, the approach is still frequently described. See, e.g., R. SPRINTHALL, supra
note 32, at 208; Haan, Processesof MoralDevelopment: Cognitive or Social Disequilibrium?,
21 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 996, 1005 (1985) [hereinafter Processesof Moral Development].
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of which several exist,1 50 indicate that most college age students
fall somewhere between Kohlberg's stages three and four. 151
In a recent essay, G.M. Dickinson, a member of the education faculty at the University of Western Ontario, described
Kohlberg's ideas in the context of lawyering activity. 152 Choosing not to use the now classic Heinz hypothetical-should Heinz
steal a drug he cannot afford to save his dying wife?-Dickinson
instead describes a hypothetical situation in which a lawyer
receives confidential information from a client that the client
murdered several small children and buried their bodies. The
lawyer is aware from newspaper accounts that these children
have been missing for weeks and that their parents are distraught. Dickinson provides a composite descriptions of a lawyer's possible responses to this dilemma in the context of
1 53
Kohlberg's six levels of moral development.
150. Of the various test instruments designed to measure moral development, the two
most widely used are Kohlberg's and Colby's Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), A. COLBY,
J. GIBBS, & L. KOHLBERG, THE ASSESSMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT: STANDARD FORM
SCORING MANUAL (1979); and the Defining Issues Test (DIT), J. REST, DEVELOPMENT
IN JUDGING MORAL ISSUES 289-96 (1979); see also Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby,
Construction and Validation of a Simplified, Group-AdministerableEquivalent to the Moral
Judgment Interview, 1982 CHILD DEV. 895 (comparison of the DIT, the MJI, and the
Sociomoral Reflection Measure). One additional test, the Ethical Reasoning Inventory, is
discussed in Page & Bode, Inducing Changes in Moral Reasoning, 112 J. PSYCHOLOGY 113
(1982) [hereinafter Page].

151. See NEw

DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION:

RETHINKING COLLEGE

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR VALUES 38 (M. McBee ed. 1980) (summary of the data).
152. See Dickinson, supra note 142.
153. Id. at 186-87, 191-92. Unfortunately, Dickinson's descriptions of the possible
responses clearly indicate a bias in favor of the upper Kohlberg stages. Any test instrument
based on these descriptions, therefore, would be fatally flawed. Test takers would notice
the bias and tend to provide answers that would please the testers. Better descriptions of
the possible responses eliminate that bias. For example, the following possible responses to
the Heinz hypothetical carry no hidden bias.
Stage 1. He should not take it because he would unquestionably be arrested
and put in prison since he broke the law.
Stage 2. He should not take it because someone else discovered and owns the
drug and so has absolute authority over it.
Stage 3. He should not take it because following the law is imperative to
prevent confusion and chaos caused by bad people.
Stage 4. He should not take it because the law is necessary for order in
society and prevents arbitrary decisions by individuals.
Stage 5. He should not take it because the law is essential to protect basic
human rights against deliberate violation by others.
Walker, supra note 35, at 962.
This description, of course, does not contain a reference to stage six. As will be noted
below, Kohlberg in his later work has abandoned his claim for the existence of that stage.
See infra text accompanying note 154. The most concise description of Kohlberg's original
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Kohlberg's Stage
1. Punishment
Orientation

2.

Hedonistic
Orientation

3.

Good Boy
Orientation

4.

Law and Order
Orientation

5.

Social Contract

6.

Orientation to
Universal
Ethical
Principles
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Possible Responses to the
Dilemma

Cognitive Characteristics

Conform to Code of professional
conduct for fear of official censure
by the Law Society, for fear of
civil suit for damages by the
client, for fear of physical
reprisals by the client.
Conform according to economic
considerations. Fear of loss of
clientele, loss of licence. Disclose
information to achieve money
reward.

Orientation to punishment,
reward and to physical and
material power which are valued
in their own right rather than as
merely underpinning a respected
moral order (see stage 4).
Instrumental relativist orientation.
Hedonistic concern for
satisfaction of one's own needs
primarily. Reciprocity exists but
only out of concern for self-gain
rather than loyalty, gratitude, or
justice.
"Good-boy" orientation. Good
behavior is that which pleases
others and gains their approval.
Stereotypical images of what is
majority or natural behavior.

Conform to professional norm to
avoid unofficial or "social"
censure by one's professional
colleagues. Avoiding what is
perceived as "unlawyerly"
conduct.
Conform to Law Society's
prescriptions or Authority that
ought to be obeyed for its sake.
Professional duty is defined in the
Rules of Professional Conduct
and it is the lawyer's duty to
obey.
The rules of solicitor-client
privilege are societally derived
standards of behavior essential to
the operation of the English
system. It is the individual
client's "right" to be able to speak
to his lawyer without fear of his
words being used against him.
Conform to the rules but if they
are bad[,I i.e. little social utility,
move to change them but
according to the rules' provision
for change.
Act to avoid self-censure. Human
dignity and avoidance of suffering
of parents supersedes societally
derived rule relating to legal
rights of a confessed murderer.

Law and order orientation.
Emphasis on authority, fixed
rules, maintaining social order.
Doing one's duty and respecting
authority and social order for its
own sake.
Social contract legalistic
orientation. Right action defined
by societally agreed standards as
well as general individual rights.
Constitutional and democratic
emphasis. If the law is bad,
change it but via legal process
and accordirig to rational
consideration of social utility.
The official morality of the
American government and
Constitution.
Orientation to universal ethical
principles. Right action is defined
by Choice of lesser decisions of
conscience in accord with
universal principles of justice, of
reciprocity and equality of human
rights, and of respect for dignity
of human beings as individuals[.]

Unfortunately, Dickinson's essay does not reflect the considerable evolution in Kohlberg's ideas over the years. In recent
work, for example, Kohlberg and his colleague Anne Colby have
dropped stage six from the sequence 154 because they have been
position is a chart reproduced in R. HERSH, supra note 141, at 124-26 (1980). This chart
contains reference to stage six.
154. See Walker, supra note 35, at 962. Ironically, although Kohlberg has now
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unable to find any empirical evidence for its existence in their
cross-cultural studies. In addition, Kohlberg and Colby now
argue that substages exist at all levels. Moral judgments at substage A tend to stress external considerations or literal interpretations of roles, duties, and rules, and tend to be unilateral and
particularistic rather than generalized or universal. Judgments
at substage B, however, involve greater universality and generalization. They involve a deeper understanding of the spirit,
155
rather than the letter, of the rules.
In the context of its impact on legal education, the most
important evolutionary aspect in the Kohlberg theory, and the
one most overlooked by legal scholars, involves Kohlberg's initial classification and then repeated reclassification of people
who engage in what he calls relativistic moral reasoning. 156 In
his initial 1957 research, Kohlberg identified a high school age
adolescent who had reached what Kohlberg thought to be an7
15
exceptionally high level of moral development for his age.
Kohlberg considered this student, whom he dubbed Case 65, a
model high school student. Case 65 possessed outstanding academic and leadership qualities. Kohlberg eventually classified
this student as a stage four reasoner, a very high classification
for a high school student. When Case 65 was interviewed as a
college sophomore, however, he seemed to have regressed backdropped stage six from the sequence, he speculated in the mid-1970s that a stage seven
existed, a "cosmic" perspective that people only gained in old age. See H. ROSEN, supra
note 134, at 87-88.
155. See generally 2 L. KOHLBERG, supra note 145, at 183-205. In an abstract way,
these substages resemble aspects of what some psychologists call cognitive style. Some
individuals, this second group of psychologists believes, are field independent, that is, they
are particularly good at impersonal and analytic tasks. They also have the ability to isolate
discrete elements within an experience. In a sense, field independent individuals resemble
Kohlberg's substage A. Conversely, field dependent individuals take a global approach and
tend to be more humanistic in their thinking. They favor a personal approach. In a sense,
therefore, field dependent people resemble people at Kohlberg's substage B. For a brief
description of the literature of cognitive styles, and a few references, see Townsend & Ede,
Cognitive Styles of Law Students: Prosecution and Defense, 57 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 762
(1985).
An important point must be made, however, when the ideas of cognitive style theorists
and developmental psychologists are compared. Developmental psychologists believe that
people evolve through a series of stages. The personality thus changes. Cognitive style
theorists, however, think that field dependence and field independence are inherent
characteristics in people that do not change over time.
156. In Perry's terminology, relativism in the context of moral reasoning alone is
multiplicity.
157. The following discussion is drawn from 2 L. KOHLBERG, supra note 145, at 47279. See also Colby, supra note 145, at 72-73.
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wards to stage two. The student had become in fact a college
aged Raskolnikov. Just before the Kohlberg college interview,
for example, Case 65 had shamelessly stolen something from a
close friend in order to wake up that friend to the horrors of the
world.
Case 65 presented Kohlberg with an extraordinary problem. Crucial to Kohlberg's theory is the idea of irreversible
upward progression in development. Moral regression cannot
occur. Case 65 threatened that basic tenet. After extensive
debate, Kohlberg and his colleagues concluded that Case 65 had
not in fact regressed in college at all. Rather, he had progressed
upward from his stage 4 high school status to a new stage, stage
4.5. Kohlberg's stage 4.5 is "[t]he stage of personal and subjective morality. What is right is based on emotion and intuition,
and conscience is seen as arbitrary and relative, as are ideas such
as duty and moral right."' 158 Of course, as this definition demonstrates, Kohlberg's relativisitic stage 4.5 seems very similar to
Perry's multiplistic position 4.
Evolution of the Kohlberg theory in the context of relativism (Perry's multiplicity) did not end, however, with the creation of stage 4.5. In recent years stage 4.5 has itself been
dropped,' 59 because Kohlberg's researchers have identified relativisitic thinking in young people who are just moving between
stages three and four. In light of this recent discovery, Kohlberg
and his colleagues have concluded that relativism can exist at all
levels and can serve a transitional function anywhere along the
developmental scale.' 60
Ironically, after he graduated from college, Kohlberg's Case
65 went on to law school and then to a flourishing legal practice.
However, no further moral development has occurred for him.
Even today, according to latest reports, Case 65 remains locked
at stage four. Similarly, the only other lawyer interviewed by
Kohlberg has never progressed beyond stage four. This suggests
two intriguing questions. Could it be that law school itself hinders development beyond stage four? Could it be that law students and lawyers, immersed as they are in rules and laws, come
to see stage four as the end of the moral developmental line, just
158.

R. KELSO & C. KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 522 (1984).

159. See generally Colby, supra note 145, at 112.

160. As a result of these recent developments, Case 65's college interview has been
once again reclassified. This interview, Kohlberg and Colby now believe, like Case 65's
high school inteview, reflects stage four reasoning.
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as they may come to see Perry's multiplicity and relativism as
the end of the intellectual developmental line?
Kohlberg himself seems to recognize that moral development for law students may end at stage four when he speculates
about what happened over the years to Case 65:
[Case 65] lays the responsibility for fair and just outcomes at
the feet of the system of law-the procedures of law, juries, and
judges. This neat division of responsibility between himself as
a lawyer and the justice system allows him to say he can
cope ....
While the role of lawyer involves a high level of job
responsibility.

.

., it divorces the responsibility for defense from

that for the fairness of the outcome of a trial, responsibility
which is placed on the court system, instead. In addition,...
the role of lawyer161clearly defines toward whom one should...
act strategically.
Several empirical studies confirm the accuracy of
Kohlberg's speculations and demonstrate that many law students indeed do not move beyond Kohlberg's stage four. In one
study, Professors Tapp and Levine used open-ended questions to
stimulate discussion among law students about moral reasoning. 162 They compared the responses of law students to
responses of college students, teachers, and prison inmates.
They discovered that law students tended to reason at about the
same levels as the other three groups and rarely higher than
Kohlberg's stage four. 163 In another study, Professors Willging
and Dunn used James Rest's Defining Issues Test to place first
year law students on Kohlberg's scale. 164 These researchers also
concluded that most law students do not move beyond
Kohlberg's level four.1 65 Perhaps the most important study in
161. 2 L. KOHLBERG, supra note 145, at 475, 479.
162. Tapp & Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategiesfor an EthicalLegality, 27 STAN.

L. REv. 1 (1974).
163. Id. at 25-26.
164. Willging & Dunn, The MoralDevelopment of the Law Student: Theory and Data
on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306 (1981) (reviews considerable empirical
research).
165. Willging and Dunn also found ro increase in moral reasoning level after
students took a course in legal ethics. Id. at 355. This finding, however, should not be
taken as a blanket condemnation of such courses' ability to promote development. Studies
conducted at the undergraduate level have demonstrated that significant increases in moral
reasoning can occur if students are exposed to an ethics course. See generally Page, supra
note 150.
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this context, however, is a study of almost two hundred lawyers
by Lawrence Landwehr. 166 He found that about 7% of them
were at Kohlberg's stage 3, over 90% of them were at stage 4,
and only about 2% of them were at stage 5. In a normal crosssection of the adult population, somewhere between 30% and
50% of the tested individuals would be at stage 4.167 In short,
stage four reasoning on the Kohlberg
scale is tremendously over68
represented among lawyers.1
166. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progressivesor Reactionaries: The Law and Order
Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers, 7 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 39 (1982); see also Muntz,
Opinions of Divinity and Law Students on Social Class, 34 J. EDUC. Soc. 221, 229 (1961)
(law students are almost wholly lacking in egalitarian ideology); Willock, Getting on with
Sociologists, 1 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 3 (1974) (lawyers tend to be more conforming than
sociologists).
167. Landwehr, supra note 166, at 44-45.
168. David Bryden's recent study of the legal reasoning skills of law students also
suggests, although indirectly, that a considerably large number of law students do not move
beyond Kohlberg's stage four. See Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn?A Pilot Study,
34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479 (1984). Bryden hypothesized that legal education ought to instill
in students certain specific kinds of reasoning skills. One of these skills, functional analysis,
involves searching for and identifying the ideas, policies, and purposes that lie behind
particular rules of statutory or common law. Id. at 481. In a very rough sense, Bryden's
functional analysis corresponds to reasoning at Kohlberg's post-conventional stages five
and six. In both functional analysis and these upper stages of moral reasoning, the purpose
behind a rule far transcends the rule itself in importance. Furthermore, in both functional
analysis and the upper stages of moral reasoning, the rule itself can be circumvented, or
even disobeyed, if doing so better serves society's overall interests (stage five) or is more
consistent with a universal principle (stage six). Bryden's data on law students' functional
analysis ability proved somewhat disappointing. He discovered that a considerable number
of graduating law students made little or no attempt to engage in that kind of lawyering
skill. For these students, therefore, the rule rather than the rule's rationale controlled.
Another recent empirical study also deserves mention in this context. Douglas
McFarland collected data on the image that law students have of an ideal law school
professor. McFarland, Students and PracticingLawyers Identify the Ideal Law Professor,
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93 (1986). McFarland grouped students' responses into three
prototypical law school teachers. (Unfortunately, McFarland seems to have been
unfamiliar with Coplin & Williams, Women Law Students' Descriptions of Self and the
Ideal Lawyer, 2 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN Q. 323 (1978) [hereinafter Coplin], a work that
also discussed ideal images in legal education.) McFarland's data reveal that more than a
third of the beginning law students identified the "socratic trainer" as ideal. McFarland,
supra, at 98. In effect, students who identified this type of teacher as ideal indicated that
they wanted abstract reason and intellect to control their own lives. By the end of their law
school careers, however, very few third year law students described the socratic trainer as
ideal. In fact, for that prototype teacher the third year students had substituted as ideal an
anti-socratic practitioner image. These prototypical teachers, according to McFarland,
principally express interest in the nuts and bolts of the rules and laws themselves. These
teachers, of course, seem to be operating at Kohlberg's stage four. For McFarland's
students at least, stage four teachers gradually became the runaway winners in the ideal
teacher race. Id.
An additional facet of McFarland's data deserves special mention. Conspicuously
absent from that data is any suggestion that as students move through law school they may
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There can be little doubt that lawyers and law students do
not stand up well when measured on the Kohlberg scale. To be
sure, the Kohlberg studies involving lawyers may confirm the
accuracy of the many nonlawyers' beliefs that lawyers care only
about the rules of law and nothing about more fundamental values. But these Kohlberg oriented studies of law students and
lawyers may also suggest that Kohlberg's scale of stages simply
does not work when applied to legally trained individuals; some
other system may be needed to evaluate law students and
lawyers.
B. Moral Dialogue
When Norma Haan began her work studying the moral
development of adolescents and young adults, Lawrence
Kohlberg's ideas strongly influenced her. 169 In fact, Haan parbe drawn toward a caring person image as the ideal law school teacher. The percentage of
students who identified the caring teacher as ideal remained constant-about one-thirdthroughout the three year period. This is quite ironic. Of the several kinds of law teachers
described by McFarland, only the caring teachers actually interacted with students on a
personal level. Conversely, McFarland's socratic trainers cared only about developing
intellectual skills in students. Furthermore, McFarland's anti-socratic practitioners
concentrated almost exclusively on providing students with information about particular
substantive fields.
Another recent study by McFarland examines images that law school teachers have of
themselves. McFarland, Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking the Schism in Legal
Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDuc. 232 (1985). Law school teachers, he suggests, tend to fall
into one of three categories; the caring liberal arts teacher, the teaching lawyer and activist,
and the "touch humanist scholar." Id. at 248. McFarland suggests that one of the
principal reasons why so much acrimony may exist in law schools regarding teaching itself
is because these different kinds of law school teachers simply do not know how to talk to
each other. Ia at 257-60.
McFarland's various prototypes are surprisingly similar to teacher prototypes
described by Joseph Axelrod in his extraordinarily provocative and helpful book, THE
UNIVERSITY TEACHER AS ARTIST (1973). Axelrod tries to describe what makes up good

teaching in higher education. To do this, he draws up picture prototypes of four different
master teachers. One of these is a "principles and facts teacher" and one is an "instructorcentered teacher." Axelrod also describes a "student-as-mind teacher" and a "student-asperson teacher." These last two are remarkably similar to McFarland's socratic trainer and
caring person. Id. at 42-43; see also infra note 104.
For other excellent books containing descriptions of teachers in higher education, see
S. ERICKSON, THE ESSENCE OF GOOD TEACHING (1984) (a systematic attempt to explain
what good teachers do); 0. MILTON, ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRADITIONAL (1972)

(describing how often little real learning occurs in higher education); 0. MILTON, ON
COLLEGE TEACHING (1978) (describing the complete transformation in teaching style that
occurred when a 25 year veteran teacher finally asked himself what he wanted students to
learn in a particular course that he was teaching).
169. The following discussion is drawn from N. HAAN, E. AERTS, & B. COOPER, ON
MORAL GROUNDS: THE SEARCH FOR PRACTICAL MORALITY (1985) [hereinafter N.
HAAN, ON MORAL GROUNDS]; Haan, Processes of Moral Development, supra note 149.
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ticipated with Kohlberg in some of his early studies. Notwithstanding her basic Kohlberg orientation, however, Haan's
independent research increasingly raised troubling concerns.
She was bothered, for example, by the apparent necessity of educational sophistication and chronological maturity as accompaniments to Kohlberg's advanced stages of development. In
addition, Haan's later research indicated to her that a distinct
cultural factor played a role in the achievement of Kohlberg's
upper stages of reasoning. High level Kohlberg reasoners, she
noticed, seemed to be disproportionately from white, middle, or
upper middle-class backgrounds. Finally, influenced by the
work of Carole Gilligan,170 Haan sensed in Kohlberg's work a
certain link between high level development on the Kohlberg
scale and gender. Males seemed to predominate at Kohlberg's
higher levels.
Haan was particularly troubled that Kohlberg's theory
seems to require moral activity to occur in a highly individualistic and an essentially judicial or judge-like fashion. Although
Kohlberg's approach probably is not so stark as Haan contends,
his approach does have an individualistic and judicial feel to
it. 171 For Kohlberg, moral principles exist independently of the
170. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) [hereinafter DIFFERENT VOICE].
171. For example, in his later work, Kohlberg frequently talks of a just community as
a forum in which young people can best develop their sense of morality. In such a

community, students themselves are largely responsible for making moral choices. Making
moral choices promotes development. Haan agrees. She calls for the opportunity by
students to participate in "actual and important moral experience," to be moral decision
makers, and not just to talk about decision making.
Ironically, many law schools have had in place for years mechanisms through which
students can participate in making moral choices. These mechanisms are legal clinics or
other supervised practice opportunities. Many of these other opportunities involve
students working in the legal departments of various government agencies. Unfortunately,
clinical programs are at best stepchildren in American legal education. Although most
legal educators now view such programs as worthwhile, they do so only because the
programs are a good mechanism for giving students training in certain practical skills. At
virtually all schools, therefore, clinical programs and faculty take a backseat to traditional
substantive law courses such as contracts, criminal law, or income taxation. In short, at
most law schools, clinical experiences for students are considered a necessary evil.
Developmental theory completely turns the tables on the debate over the place of
clinical experiences in the law school curriculum. Under the developmental theories of
Perry, Kohlberg, or Haan, actual experience best promotes movement toward the highest
levels of development. Therefore, clinical experiences in law schools actually are higher
level developmental tools than substantive law courses. This should not be surprising.
Knowledge never really occurs in classrooms. However, it constantly occurs in supervised
practice settings and is the essence of the practice experience. In such practice, therefore,
students quickly realize that they must orient themselves in a relativistic world through
commitment (Perry's position six). Furthermore, in supervised practice, students can make
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people involved in the making of a moral choice. These princiinitial commitments (position seven) and then can actually experience the implications of
those commitments (position eight). Finally, some very skilled practice instructors may
even be able to help students begin to realize that life itself as a practicing lawyer has
meaning only if it involves an ongoing, unfolding series of commitments. Practice
experiences also promote moral development in young law students, whether that
development is along the lines described by Kohlberg or those proposed by Haan. Clinics
involve students in repeatedly making nonhypothetical, irreversible moral choices. They
personify, therefore, what Kohlberg tries to encourage with the just community idea and
what Haan calls for in her statement about actual and important moral experience.
Notwithstanding the extraordinarily important role that practice or clinical
experiences should play as a developmental tool in legal education, such experiences by
themselves cannot be expected to help law students move beyond moral and intellectual
relativism. Some help should also be provided by classroom instruction, albeit instruction
that might be modified dramatically from that which currently occurs in most law schools.
In connection with Perry's theory, for example, certain classroom changes might be made.
As noted earlier, expressions by students of values, feelings, and beliefs may well be masks
for dualistic thinking. Thus, contrary to what some humanistic educators seem to think, all
expressions by law students of feelings and values should not necessarily be warmly
received. Dualistic thinking, especially when disguised in language of feelings and values,
must be rooted out, perhaps by rigorous use of the case method. However, teachers who
help students move out of dualistic reasoning must never suggest that values or beliefs have
no place in the world of lawyers. Rather, they must concentrate exclusively on exposing
the diversity of values and feelings among various students and the potential conflicts
among the student's own values and feelings.
Some changes in legal education might be more dramatic. Traditional methods of
classroom education in law school simply cannot do all of the developmental jobs that legal
education must accomplish. The case method, for example, seems poorly equipped to help
students move to Perry's commitment positions, to Kohlberg's post-conventional reasoning
stages, or to Haan's upper levels of moral dialogue. The problem method, as that method is
usually employed, seems little better. Both of these methods are ill suited because they look
principally to the past and deal inordinately with resolution of disputes through some
variation of the litigation process. Discussions of moral values and commitment choices
seem out of place in both of these contexts. The past facts exist. They cannot be re-created
according to some better moral system. Furthermore, the process of litigation in this
country is controlled by the adversary system. As noted earlier, that system seems at best
to co-exist in a tenuous way with traditional conceptions of moral behavior.
Perhaps the best solution lies in a major restructuring of the upper division law
curriculum. This might take two forms. First, the emphasis in upper division classes
would shift away from dealing with past facts and toward dealing with future facts.
Creation of the future necessarily involves making moral choices. Students in the upper
division of law school, therefore, might continually be confronted by exercises in which
they had to advise clients regarding future choices. "What should your client do to avoid
or anticipate a future dispute?" "How can we make sure past mistakes do not happen
again?" Such questions might become the dominant ones in the upper division. The
second aspect of the restructuring of the upper division curriculum could involve shifting
the focus away from litigation and litigation type dispute resolution, and toward dispute
resolution by negotiation and compromise. Litigation in an adversary system creates at
best moral ambivalence. Negotiation and compromise, however, necessitate making moral
choices. Furthermore, if Norma Haan is correct, the highest levels of moral dialogue
consist of advanced skills of negotiation and compromise. Stressing those things in the
upper division of law school, therefore, could be an extraordinarily powerful developmental
tool.
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ples are objectively true. In effect, Kohlberg argues that moral
development occurs as people learn how to understand those
objectively true moral principles and thereafter apply them to
specific situations.
Haan completely disagrees. 7 2 Kohlberg's description of
moral development, Haan ultimately concludes, does not reflect
the way people actually make moral choices. According to
Haan, something completely different occurs, which she
describes as an "interactional" formulation.173 People make
moral choices through a process of engaging in dialogues with
other affected individuals.
Although Haan's theory shares many characteristics with
Kohlberg's, most notably a stage or developmental approach, it
is in many ways radically different. Unlike Kohlberg's, Haan's
theory readily allows emotion to serve as a choice-making mechanism. Furthermore, Haan's theory emphasizes action and
moral dialogue to a far greater extent than does Kohlberg's.
"Dialogue is the form of all moral activity," Haan writes, "and
dialogue is action."' 174 Finally, Haan's approach concentrates
almost entirely on processes that people use for resolving specific
moral dilemmas. Reference to large scale moral principles is
avoided. Kohlberg's system, however, seems to encourage
attempts to find universally applicable solutions to moral
dilemmas.
Haan believes that people gradually develop moral choice
making abilities through a continuum of five levels. 175 At
Haan's level one, which is similar in some ways to Kohlberg's
stage one, "others force me/I force them."'' 76 Life is viewed as
"A versus B."' 77 "I have unqualified rights to secure my own
good"' 78 is the motto of this level.
Level two on Haan's continuum, which is again similar to
Kohlberg's stage two, should also seem familiar to legal educators who have watched students learn to cope with law school.
Law students often begin to recognize, usually in the second or
172. Haan frequently discusses the differences between her theory and Kohlberg's.
See, e.g., N. HAAN, ON MORAL GROUNDS, supra note 169, at 50-72.

173. Id. at 38-41.
174. Id. at 68.
175. All of the following descriptions and quotations are drawn from a chart that
Haan provides of the five-stage sequence. Id at 62-64.
176. Id at 64.
177. Id. at 62.
178. Id at 63.
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third semester, that other students also have rights. Emphasis
here is on the word "also." At Haan's level two, interests other
than one's own must be considered. Haan's phrase, "I have a
right to secure my own good as others do,"1 79 captures the
essence of this level. At this stage, people "[t]rade to get what
self wants; sometimes others must get what they want."1 1s0
Countless law students say similar things. "I'll give you my
notes, if you give me yours." "I don't have any choice but to
trust you on that point. You wouldn't cheat me, would you?"
In effect,
at this level people take "blind chances on others' good
faith." 81
Emphasis on self-interest diminishes as people reach Haan's
level three. Again not surprisingly, Haan's description of this
level sounds like Kohlberg's description of his stage three. At
this level, according to Haan, individuals assume that most people, including themselves, have or should have good faith. Acting on that fundamental assumption, level three individuals
recognize reciprocity. Thus, they deal with others of good faith
and simply shun those rare persons who exhibit bad faith.
Haan's descriptions of levels two and three of moral development sound much like what goes on in most law school study
groups. In some groups, self-interest controls. People study
together only to advance their own interests. However, in some
study groups, self-interest is thought to be identical with other's
interests. "All of us will do better on our exams if we cooperate," students in this latter group conclude.
Haan believes that a major developmental breakthrough
takes place when people move to level four. Movement to this
level occurs, she argues, because people gradually come to realize that level three's fundamental assumption about the essential
goodness of oneself and most others is unrealistic. All people,
including oneself, act in bad faith from time to time. "Others
(and myself) can be culpable." 1 82 "All persons fall from
grace."' 18 3 Mindful of the shortcomings of all individuals, people
making moral decisions at Haan's level four agree to common
rules and regulations to protect their mutual interests. Reciprocity still controls. "I commit myself to the common struc179. Id.
180. Id. at 62.
181. Id. at 63.
182. Id
183. Id.
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tured exchange," Haan writes about people functioning at this
level, "so I deserve the same considerations and privileges as
others receive from common practices."'"" In a sense, of course,
this description of Haan's level four is similar to the rule-based
mechanism of moral choice making described as Kohlberg's
stage four. Structured exchanges, rules, and regulations take the
place of case by case determinations.
Haan's level five, the last one on her continuum, reiterates
the importance of reciprocity and describes moral dialogue as
the forum in which moral choices are made. At this level, Haan
breaks completely from Kohlberg. Objectively true principles
do not exist. Rather, everything is in flux. "I have human vulnerability, weaknesses and strengths as a moral agent," Haan
says of a person acting at level five, "but I have responsibility to
myself, others, and our mutual interest to require that others
treat me as a moral object. If I don't, the moral balance will be
upset."' 185 Using language that sounds like William Perry's
description of his ninth and last position of intellectual development-life as a series of ongoing, unfolding commitmentsHaan says of a person acting at level five: "[W]e are a part of
each other's existence."' 1 6 Haan admits, and in doing so again
echoes Perry, that her view of social interchange will trouble
people who hope for absolute or objective truth in their lives.
"[E]veryday life leads to compromises, temporary injustices that
18 7
are rectified later, and choices between the lesser of evils.'
People must develop "awareness
and forgiveness of human falli188
bilities and complexities."'
"What exactly develops in moral development?," Haan
asks in a crucial passage. "It seems not to be moral understanding."' 18 9 Haan's understanding of moral development differs
from Kohlberg's high-level developmental stages. High-level
moral development may be "tolerance for conflict and the skills
of conflict resolution that allow tension to be endured long
enough for disputants to draw on their past experience, invent
possibilities, and mutually determine the legitimacy of one
another's self interests to reach mutual resolution of their dis184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id at 64.
Id at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 70.
Id.
Haan, Processes of Moral Development, supra note 149, at 1006.
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cord."' 190 Clearly, this is multiplicity or relativism.
The kind of moral activity just described is not at all what
Kohlberg describes as occurring at his upper stages of moral
development. A critical point must now be made. Haan's highest level moral activity is a precise description of what most lawyers do on a daily basis. This connection is made clear in the
following passage:
[M]oral action is thought to be a two step process of identifying
the pertinent moral, personal, and objective elements of particular situations and then separating the wheat from the chaff;
consequently final actions are likely to be found that "fit" the
actors and the situation. When this process is shared among
participants, they are more likely to achieve moral balances
and enact them. However, all situations are new, so in some
degree moral solutions are always created. 19 1

If, in the foregoing quotation, the word "legal" had been substituted on several occasions for the word "moral," most readers
would think that the words were those of a lawyer 1or
legal edu92
psychologist.
developmental
a
of
than
rather
cator
An enormous schism that divides the various schools of
developmental psychology can now be clearly seen. Lawrence
Kohlberg does not accept multiplicity or relativism as the under1 93
lying epistemological stance that climaxes moral development,
190. Id.
191. N. HAAN, ON MORAL GROUNDS, supra note 169, at 69-70.
192. Several additional theories of moral development, somewhat different from both
Kohlberg's and Haan's, must be noted here, if only briefly. All share with Haan the idea of
making moral choices in the context of the specific environment surrounding a particular
moral problem. In a sense, therefore, these theories fall into the relativistic camp. James
Rest, best known for his development of the Defining Issues Test, which is frequently used
to place people on the Kohlberg scale, recently theorized that moral decision making
involves four interrelated activities. First, individuals must interpret the dilemma. Then
they must formulate a plan for dealing with it. Next, the plan is evaluated. Finally, the
original or a modified plan is implemented. Rest, The Major Components of Morality, in
MORALITY, MORAL BEHAVIOR, AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 24-36.

Rest, like Haan, does not look for universally applicable moral principles. Another group
of psychologists, sometimes referred to as contextualist theorists, have similar ideas. Moral
choices are only made in context. For many references to this body of work, see
Zimmerman, Social Learning Theory: A ContextualistAccount of Cognitive Functioning,in
RECENT ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY (C. Brainerd ed. 1983).
Another group of psychologists is interested in an idea that is sometimes referred to as
values clarification. These psychologists also promote a relativistic perspective. See B.
CHAZAN, CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO MORAL EDUCATION 50-55, 131-33 (1985).
193. This aspect of Kohlberg's work is discussed in considerable detail in Liebert,
What Develops in Moral Development?, in MORALITY, MORAL BEHAVIOR, AND MORAL
DEVELOPMENT 177, supra note 1; see also Kurtines, Certainty and Morality, supra note 1,
at 3; see also Boyd, The Rawls Connection, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, MORAL
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nor do Professors Kitchener and King, the originators of the
cognitive development theory of reflective judgment. These theorists insist that certain universally applicable and objectively
true ideas and principles do exist. For them, development
involves movement toward acceptance of that fact. Thus, they
follow in the tradition of Plato. Conversely, William Perry for
the cognitive development psychologists and Norma Haan for
the moral development psychologists believe that objective truth
does not exist and that development principally involves the
ability to live with that uncomfortable fact. In a sense, therefore, they follow in the tradition of Protagoras.
III.

LEGAL EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL

PSYCHOLOGY:

A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

Something very similar to the previously described schism
about relative and objective truth in the world of developmental
psychology also divides the world of current legal education.
Roger Cramton, a prominent spokesperson for mainstream legal
education, 194 has repeatedly and strongly argued against relativism in legal education. "Modem dogmas entangle legal education," Cramton wrote several years ago in an influential essay,
"a moral relativism tending toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward an amoral instrumentalism, a realism tending toward
cynicism.
."195 Cramton explains why moral relativism
(Perry's multiplicity) is so dangerous in the law school
environment.
If all law and truth are relative, pressing one's own views on
others would be arrogant and mischievous. But if there is
really something that can be called truth, beauty or justiceeven if in our finiteness we cannot always agree on what it isthen law school can be a place of searching and creativity that
aspires to identify and accomplish justice. If ethical relativism
reigns supreme, law will become even more complex and
detailed, and finally boring, and law school will merely be a
EDUCATION AND KOHLBERG, supra note 145, at 185-213; and J. REIMER, supra note 145,
at 80, for discussions linking Kohlberg's work to the modem philosophic tradition of John
Rawls.
194. Until recently, Cramton was the long time editor of the JOURNAL OF LEGAL

EDUCATION. Cramton also was the principal author of the American Bar Association's
extraordinarily influential 1980 report on legal education; see ABA, Report, supra note 116.
195. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247, 262 (1978) [hereinafter The OrdinaryReligion]; see also Cramton, Beyond The
Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1987).
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dull and unpleasant place on the gateway to a supposedly
learned profession. At least the scientist, even if he is an ethical
relativist, has something new to discover about the world of
nature. If truth and justice have no reality or coherence, what
does the lawyer have to do? And why should a trade schoolfor that 196
is what it would be-occupy space on the university
campus?

For Cramton, who represents the mainstream in modem
legal educational theory, law school educators should first help
to identify objective truths and then train students to bring them
to bear upon human made law and legal institutions. The mainstream, however, is not the only stream.
A.

CriticalLegal Studies

For more than a decade, the usually calm world of American legal education has been dramatically upset by a small group
of very controversial legal educators, members of the Critical
Legal Studies movement (CLS). Although few in number, CLS
proponents have had a disproportionately large impact in legal
education circles. This is principally because large numbers of
"Crits," as they are called, are concentrated at two of this country's most elite law schools, Harvard and Stanford.
The CLS movement, although difficult to describe in general terms, springs from three roots, all of which rely on multiplistic or relativistic beliefs. 197 One of the roots is the
American legal realism tradition of the 1920s and 1930s. Members of that tradition argued that formalistic legal reasoning
inevitably concealed subjective value choices. Thus, according
to the realists, legal reasoning could never generate outcomes in
controversial disputes independent of the political or economic
ideology of the judge. For the realists, justice could never have
an objective meaning.
The second root of CLS is a modem European technique of
literary criticism called deconstruction, which seeks to demonstrate that words and texts lead down a blind alley. Deconstruction denies that any particular mode of linguistic signification
196. Cramton, The OrdinaryReligion, supra note 195, at 263. Cramton's comment
about the ethical relativist scientist's belief in the truth of certain physical phenomena
suggests that Cramton himself is unaware of the extent to which ideas about relativism

have pervaded the world of science and the philosophy of science.
197. The following discussion is principally drawn from Critical Legal Studies
Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984).
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can achieve hegemony and that interpretation is merely an endless exercise in unbounded free play. Epistemological indeterminacy controls.
The last root of the CLS movement in modem legal education is the critical theory of early twentieth century European
political philosophers. This theory, which built heavily upon the
work of Karl Marx, attempted to expose the oppressive aspects
and contradictions supposedly inherent in capitalistic society. A
crucial element of critical theory, and now seemingly of the CLS
movement, is the Marxist idea of historical contingency. This
idea, according to CLS advocate Mark Tushnet, establishes that
"all knowledge is a social product and thus that knowledge can
have no transcendent validity." 198 Another proponent of the

CLS approach states the contingency idea as follows:
Up to a point we can reason about these [value] conflicts and
even hope to change each other's minds, for the disagreements
turn to some extent on matters of fact and experience. But
when all reasoning and argument are over, there will be reasonable and well-informed people on both sides of each
controversy. 199

Clearly, critical legal theory insists that truth is multiplistic
or relative; thus, the underlying epistemological perspective of
the CLS movement is aligned with Perry's and Haan's perspectives. This argument, heretofore undetected by CLS proponents,
is made clear by Joseph Singer's recent attempt to justify the
CLS approach. 2° Singer tells a story about his own college
days, a story which perfectly tracks William Perry's developmental scheme. Singer describes how he became a close friend
in college of a person whose political beliefs were very different
from his own. Endless discussions ensued, yet no resolutions
were reached, even after four years of debate. Singer then
describes how, as a result, he was forced to give up one of the
198. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1220

(1981).
199. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36

STAN.

L. REV. 247, 269

(1984). Surprisingly, radical legal theorists on the political left are not the only proponents
of a nonobjectivist perspective. As Stephen Macedo has recently noted, new right legal
philosophers like former Judge Robert Bork and Lino Graglia are skeptical about the
claimed objective truth of certain moral and ethical principles. See generally S. MACEDO,
THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986). Thus, although the end result
promoted by CLS advocates is totally different from the end result promoted by these new
right thinkers, the underlying epistemological stance is the same.
200. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1

(1984).
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most basic assumptions of his adolescent life; namely, the belief
that if two intelligent and reasonable people talked long enough
about an important problem of knowledge or learning, eventually they would come to agreement. After relating these facts,
Singer states the crucial lesson of his story. "Morality is not a
matter of truth or logical demonstration.

' 20 1

It is different for

each individual. Clearly, Singer is describing his own transition
out of dualism and into multiplicity and relativism, just as
Perry's and Haan's students had described.
The connection between Singer's and Perry's ideas continues. Singer attributes the feeling of many law students that they
are losing their souls to the belief that morality and law require
rational foundations. "If we feel we need to ground our beliefs
in a way that will remove all doubts," Singer states in a crucial
passage, "and if such a firm ground is unavailable, we respond
with either despair or apathy or cynicism.

2 02

Singer suggests an

alternative approach. "The absence of secure foundations or
decision procedures for belief should be experienced not as a
void but as an opportunity.

203

Then, inadvertently using

Perry's terminology, Singer argues for movement past despair or
cynicism. "It is up to us to
live in a way that can create commit' '2 4
ments and communities.

0

To be sure, Singer does not stand alone among legal educators in his call for commitment. Roger Cramton also wants
commitment. "The [legal] educator," Cramton insists, "has an
obligation to address the values that he is serving;... to call the
legal profession and the larger society back to a covenant faith
and moral commitment that it has forsaken.

20

5

But a funda-

mental difference exists between Singer's ideas about commitment and Cramton's. For Cramton, as for Lawrence Kohlberg,
commitment and morality build upon the existence of objective
truth. For Singer and other CLS proponents, however, as for
William Perry and Norma Haan, commitment follows and
builds upon multiplicity and relativism, that is, upon the nonexistence of relative truth.
Not surprisingly, the debate between CLS proponents and
mainstream legal educators is not only a debate about the objec201. Id. at 39.
202. Id. at 67.
203. Id.

204. Id
205. Cramton, The OrdinaryReligion, supra note 195, at 263.
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tive or relative nature of truth. It is also a debate about crucially
important political and social matters. For example, much CLS
work is a radical critique of American culture, particularly the
culture of law in the United States. Furthermore, many CLS
advocates sound almost utopian in their calls for political and
social change. Ironically, a similar debate about political and
social mores currently splits the world of developmental psy-"
chology. Developmental psychology has produced its own
group of radical, almost utopian, critics of current culture in the
United States. This group consists of feminist developmental
psychologists.
B.

Feminist Psychology and the Different Voice

Carol Gilligan, a mainstream psychologist, inadvertently
launched a radical attack on mainstream developmental psychology with the publication of her book In a Different Voice. 0 6
Gilligan began her work with an innocuous observation. All of
the people interviewed by Lawrence Kohlberg and all of the people interviewed by Jean Piaget were male. Gilligan wondered
whether girls and women develop differently than boys and men.
To find out, she began interviewing girls and women and then
studied cross-sections of both males and females.
206. The following discussion is drawn from C. GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra
note 170; Dubois, Dunlap, Gilligan, MacKinnon, & Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REv. 11 (1985) [hereinafter
Gilligan, Feminist Discourse]; Gilligan, Remapping Development: The Power of Divergent
Data,in VALUE PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THEORIES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 37 (L. Cirillo
& S. Wapner eds. 1986) [hereinafter Gilligan, Remapping Development] (probably the best
introduction to Gilligan's ideas and to the difference between her ideas and the work of
Kohlberg and others); Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of Self in
Relation, in RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY AND THE
SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 237 (T. Heller, M. Sosna, & D. Wellberg eds. 1986);
Gilligan, Reply [to Critics], 11 SIGNS 324 (1986); Murphy & Gilligan, Moral Development
in Late Adolescence and Adulthood: A Critique and Reconstruction of Kohlberg's Theory,
1980 HUM. DEv. 77. For extensive secondary discussions of Gilligan's ideas, see J. Rich,
supra note 32, at 117; Ford & Lowery, Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning: A
Comparison of the Use of Justice and Care Orientations, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 777 (1986).
A particularly enlightening discussion of Gilligan's and
Kohlberg's work is Lifton, Individual Differences in Moral Development: The Relation of
Sex, Gender and Personality to Morality, 53 J. PERSONALITY 306 (1985). Lifton
differentiates between sex and gender. Sex differences, he says, involve only biological
issues, i.e., male and female. Gender differences, however, are psychological or
sociological. Some women, for example, are "masculine" in orientation and some men are
"feminine." Id. at 308. Lifton suggests that no sex differences exist between males and
females as groups in connection with moral reasoning. However, gender differences do
produce different ways of looking at moral issues. Id at 329-30.
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Gradually, Gilligan began to believe that women, as a
group, deal with moral issues very differently from men as a
group. Based on her observations of both men and women, Gilligan concluded that two different voices of moral activity exist.
One voice, frequently but by no means exclusively associated
with men, focuses on concerns for justice and reason. Gilligan
calls this the justice voice. It seems to be a voice abstractly
related to objectivism, that is, the belief that certain ideas and
principles have an objectively true existence. The other voice,
frequently albeit not exclusively associated with women, focuses
on concerns for caring and compassion. Gilligan calls this the
caring voice. 0 7 This voice is abstractly related to multiplicity
and relativism. According to Nona Lyons, a follower of Gilligan's, the justice voice is "rooted in impartiality and the search
for objectivity, the capacity to distance oneself and determine
fair rules for mediating relationships .... ,,os The caring voice,
Lyons continues, is "grounded in the specific contexts of others,
the capacity to perceive
people in their own terms and to
20 9
needs.
their
to
respond
207. Gilligan theorizes that some individuals develop the caring voice by evolving
through three phases of moral growth. This development, however, is not a staircase of
stages but rather a gradual progression upward. C. GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra

note 170, at 51. Initially these persons care only about themselves and their own needs.
This part of these individuals' lives, of course, is similar to the early stages described by
Haan and Kohlberg. Gradually, however, Gilligan argues, these individuals come to care
for others, particularly for their own dependents. Unfortunately, conflict then follows as
the person's self seems to be excluded from the circle of care. Eventually, the third aspect
of personality development occurs and the individual comes to see that caring for others is
linked to caring for one's self. The caring concern then becomes linked to the idea of caring
as the basis of all worthwhile human relations.
208. Gilligan, Remapping Development, supra note 206, at 42.
209. Id One of the very best illustrations of the differences between the caring and
the justice voices is captured in Gilligan's report on the conversation of a pair of four-yearolds. Little Girl: "'Let's play next-door neighbors.'" Little Boy: "'I want to play
pirates.'" Little Girl: "'Okay, then you can be the pirate who lives next door.'" Gilligan
comments:
By comparing this inclusive solution of combining the games with the fair
solution of taking turns and playing each game for an equal period, it is possible
to see not only how these two approaches (to moral behavior] yield different ways
of solving a problem in relationships but also how each solution differentially
affects the identity of the games and the experience of the relationship.
The fair solution of taking turns leaves the identity of each game intact,
providing an opportunity for each child to experience the other's imaginative
world and regulating the exchange by the imposition of a rule based on a premise
of equal respect. The inclusive solution, in contrast, transforms both games
through their combination .... Although the fair solution protects identity and
ensures equality within the context of a relationship, the inclusive solution
transforms identity through the experience of relationship.
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Gilligan's empirical studies included a number of interviews
with people who were, or who eventually would become, lawyers. These people provide a fascinating contrast to the lawyers
studied by Kohlberg, particularly to his Case 65.210 One of Gilli-

gan's lawyers stated that she had gone through a period in high
school where she had held a completely relativistic (that is, multiplistic) perspective on moral issues. 211 At age twenty-five, however, as a third year law student, she thought of herself
differently. She told Gilligan that she valued "a very strong
sense of being responsible to the world, having other people that
I am tied to, and also having people that I'm responsible to.' '212I
have a very strong sense of being responsible to the world.
She informed Gilligan that she was concerned about the "possibility of omission,
of your not helping others when you could
' '2 13
help them.
Two other lawyers whom Gilligan interviewed provide
additional help in understanding her theory about the different
voices of morality, and the differences between her theory and
Kohlberg's. 214 Gilligan notes that one lawyer she interviewed
had a justice orientation. "I usually resolve the dilemmas
according to my internal morality," this lawyer told Gilligan.
"The more important, publicly, your office is, the more important it is that you play by the rules. ' 215 This lawyer then
explained to Gilligan the reason for the game imagery. "You
play by the rules because society hangs together by these rules.
And, in my view, if you cheat on them, even for a laudatory
purpose, eventually you break down the rules because it is
impossible to draw fine lines. 2 1 6 Gilligan juxtaposes the foregoId. at 40. Interestingly, Gilligan's words sound vaguely like the writings of theorists inter-

ested in the previously discussed idea of cognitive styles. See supra note 155. Field dependent individuals sound a bit like Gilligan's description of people interested in inclusive
solutions and field independent individuals sound a bit like Gilligan's description of the
people interested in fair solutions. For a good discussion of cognitive style theory, see
generally
210.
211.
212.

M. MAXWELL, IMPROVING STUDENT LEARNING SKILLS (1979).
See supra text accompanying notes 157-161.
C. GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 170, at 20-21.
Id.

213. Id.
214. Gilligan reports on these two lawyers in Gilligan, FeministDiscourse,supra note

206, at 59-60.
215. Id.

216. Id at 60. The justice lawyer also said this about helping the opposing side in an
adversarial dispute: "Once you, as an attorney, step out of the role of adversary, which is

what you do if you start helping the other side, .. . then you are not being true to your role.
You are changing your function, and that destroys the system." Id. This comment should
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ing quotations with ones reflecting a caring voice. "I have to

preside over these decisions and I try to make them as non-disastrous as possible for the people who are most vulnerable," this
other lawyer
told Gilligan. "The fewer games you play, the
217
better.
Gilligan's work has generated intense response, both negative and positive. Criticism comes from all directions. Lawrence Kohlberg and Anne Colby, for example, strenuously
disagree with Gilligan. They insist that their data, and the data
of many other psychologists, indicate that both men and women
speak in the same moral voice. These theorists believe Gilligan
simply misinterpreted her data.218 Furthermore, some radical
feminists have recently criticized Gilligan's ideas219 because,
they argue, the different voice idea reinforces traditional genderbased stereotypes.
Other feminists however, believe that Gilligan's ideas herald a new way of examining human consciousness. In a recent
book, Mary Belenky and a group of colleagues attempt to link
Gilligan's ideas about women's different voice of moral development to William Perry's ideas about cognitive development.220
be considered in light of Kohlberg's description of the problems experienced by Case 65.
See supra text accompanying notes 157-61.
217. Gilligan, Feminist Discourse,supra note 206, at 60. The caring lawyer also said:
I am dealing with a legal system and dealing with something it does not know
how to deal with very well. I become very distressed because it is hard for me to
put together exactly what my role is supposed to be. You are presiding over some
pretty emotional moments in people's lives and I never know whether I should
say, "Here is the law book," and not do anything, or try to give whatever kind of
counseling, whatever kind of support, one might provide for people without
costing them a fortune. I think people need something like this.
Id.
218. See 2 L. KOHLBERG, supra note 145, at 338-70. For an attempt to resolve this
dispute, and for many references, see generally Lifton, supra note 206.
219. For a good sampling of this feminist criticism, see On In a Different Voice: An
Interdisciplinary Forum, 11 SIGNS 324 (1986). See generally Clinchy & Zimmerman,
Epistemology and Agency in the Development of Undergraduate Women, in THE
UNDERGRADUATE WOMAN: ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 161 (P. Perun ed. 1982).
220. M. BELENKY, B. CLINCHY, N. GOLDBERGER, & J. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS
OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND (1986) [hereinafter M.
BELENKY]. Another interesting example of this radical feminist psychology is Giarelli, The

Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moralization: Toward a Radical Political
Reconstruction, 164 J. EDUC. 305 (1982) (deconstructs developmental theory and provides
extensive bibliography of Marxist writings on development). At least one writer has linked
a radical feminist perspective to legal issues. Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and
Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 294 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
In the context of these references to radical political and social perspectives, two
interesting empirical studies must be noted. Both found that liberal or left-leaning students
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Although Perry interviewed a number of women students,
Belenky's group argues that Perry's nine positions essentially
describe the thinking processes of men. For Perry's nine positions, Belenky's group substitutes five different epistemological
perspectives, or, to use these authors' terminology, five women's
ways of knowing. Although these authors explicitly stop short
of claiming that their five different perspectives describe a developmental sequence through which women evolve, the book's
description of these perspectives, and the order in which the
authors place them, suggest that the authors believe, at least tentatively, that such a developmental sequence exists. The
sequence involves increasingly
greater reliance on an inner voice
221
of compassion and feeling.
Not surprisingly, Belenky and her group of radical feminist
psychologists decry traditional educational institutions that
belittle women's reliance upon an inner or different voice that
stresses caring and connection. These authors suggest that this
belittling occurs because educational institutions emphasize
adversarial and competitive learning rather than learning
processes that involve caring and cooperation. 22 In short, traditional educational institutions emphasize Kohlberg's justice
voice rather than Gilligan's caring one.
tended to score higher on the Kohlberg scale than did conservative or right-leaning
students. No satisfactory explanation for this phenomenon is provided. Emler, Renwick,
& Malone, The Relationship Between Moral Reasoning and Political Orientation, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1073 (1983); Nassi, Abramowitz, & Youmans, Moral
Development and Politicsa Decade Later: A Replication andExtension, 45 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 112 (1983).

221. All five of the women's ways of knowing described by Belenky and her
colleagues involve the use or nonuse of an inner voice of reason. See generally M.
BELENKY, supra note 220. Women who reason at the first perspective have no inner voice
at all. In fact, they do not even realize that they have an innate ability to reason and learn.
Not surprisingly, all of the women described as viewing the world from this perspective
were either quite young or almost completely uneducated. Id. at 23-24. The second
perspective is a clear advance. Here women realize that they can learn and know.
However, to these women, most of whom have limited education, a fact is simply a fact.
No method for discriminating between conflicting facts exists. See generally id. at 35-51.
At the third perspective in this sequence, women begin to rely on an inner voice of reason,
or on gut feelings that they may have. The authors note that most women at this level of
development have some, albeit fimited, education. The authors also suggest, however, that
at this point in development women find their true identity, an identity heavily influenced
by the inner voice. Id. at 54-55. Women in the final two categories described by Belenky
and her colleagues are highly educated and tend not to rely on the inner voice or on gut
feelings. Book-learning and intellectualization here replace and even conflict with the
wisdom and street smarts of the earlier categories. See generally id. at 87-130.
222. See generally id. at 190-213.
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Carrie Menkel-Meadow makes essentially the same observation about law schools.223 Objectivity and separateness are
paramount virtues in law school, she writes, as are endless concerns for fairness, justice, and rights.22 4 Furthermore, little or
no sympathy exists in law schools for connection with others, or
for responsibility and caring. 225 Menkel-Meadow suggests that
"Hilary," Gilligan's most significant lawyer-interviewee, is representative of what happens to women in law schools. 2 2 6 Hilary
experienced serious psychological distress as she found herself
being torn apart by the process of being a lawyer. 27
Menkel-Meadow boldly places the blame not so much on
the law schools but on an underlying idea that pervades the legal
system itself. The adversary system, she insists, is a masculine
model.
The basic structure of our legal system is premised on the
adversarial model, which involves two advocates who present
their cases to a disinterested third party who listens to evidence
and argument and declares one party a winner. In this simplified description of the Anglo-American model of litigation, we
can identify some of the basic concepts and values which
underlie this choice of arrangements: advocacy, persuasion,
hierarchy, competition, and binary results (win/lose). The
conduct of litigation is relatively similar (not coincidentally, I
suspect) to a sporting event-there are rules, a referee, an
object to the game, and a winner is declared after the play is
over.... [T]his conception of the dispute resolution process is
223. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 143. Other references to Gilligan's work in the
legal education literature include Bums, The Law School as a Model for Community, 10
NOVA L.J. 329, 337 (1986).
224. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 143, at 59.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 58-60.
227. C. GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 170, at 134-36, 165. Hilary told
Gilligan of an experience at trial where opposing counsel failed, by oversight, to introduce
into evidence a useful document, a document that would have advanced the opposing
lawyer's meritorious claim. Hilary deliberated about telling the opposing lawyer of the
document but then realized that "the adversary system of justice impedes not only 'the
supposed search for truth' but also the expression of concern for the person on the other
side." Id. at 135. Later, after Hilary had chosen not to reveal the mistake, she felt that she
had failed to live up to her own standards of morality. Gilligan says of Hilary: "Though
she has access, as a lawyer, to the language of rights and recognizes clearly the importance
of self determination and respect, the concept of rights remains in tension with an ethic of
care." Id. at 136.
Another one of Gilligan's lawyer-respondents is "Alex." Interestingly, Alex seemed to
move from a justice orientation toward a caring one as he experienced the breakup of an
important personal relationship. Id. at 166-67.

HeinOnline -- 62 Tul. L. Rev. 1297 1987-1988

1298

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

applied more broadly than just in the conventional courtroom.
The adversarial model affects the way in which lawyers advise
their clients ("get as much as you can"), negotiate disputes
("we can really get them on that")[,] and plan transactions
("let's be sure to draft this to your advantage"). All of these
activities in lawyering assume competition over the same limited and equally valued items (usually money) and assume that
success is measured by maximizing individualgain.2 28

To a certain extent, empirical data support MenkelMeadow's comments about the masculine nature of the adversary system. Several studies suggest that law students possess a
disproportionately high desire to dominate others.229 Psychologists usually identify the desire to dominate as a masculine trait.
Furthermore, one study discovered that women law students
tend to view the legal profession as specifically masculine in
nature. The students viewed the profession as more masculine
than they viewed themselves. 23° Finally, one study of law students conducted in light of Gilligan's ideas seems to have identified statistically significant differences between men and women
law students in connection with their respective orientations
toward caring or justice.231 Thus, data does exist that supports
228. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 143, at 50-51 (emphasis added).
229. Walsh & Palmer, Some Personality Differences Between Law and Non-LawOrientedStudents, 19 VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE Q. 11 (1970). Interestingly, this study also
found law students to be less self-critical and less self-blaming than other students. In fact,
as the Walsh and Palmer students progressed through law school, their level of selfcriticism fell off markedly. See also Reich, CaliforniaPsychologicalInventory: Profile of a
Sample of First Year Law Students, 39 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 871 (1976). Reich found law
students to be exceptionally interested in dominance, status, social pressure, and the like, at
least in terms of external appearances. However, he also discovered that their internal lives
were filled with insecurities. In short, according to Reich, law students "wear a social
mask." Id. at 873.
230. See generally Coplin, supra note 168.
231. Foster, Antigones in the Bar: Women Lawyers as Reluctant Adversaries, 10
LEGAL STUD.

F. 287 (1987).

A number of empirical studies have compared and contrasted the attitudes of male
and female law students. Unfortunately, however, none of these studies have a
developmental perspective. See generally Campbell, Differential Response for Male and
Female Law Students on the Strong-CampbellInterest Inventory: The Question of Separate
Sex Norms, 23 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY 130 (1976); Coplin, supra note 168; Frank
Psychodynamic Conflicts in Female Law Students, 39 AM. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 65 (1979)
(discussion of students treated for serious depression); Spangler, Gordon, & Pipkin, Token
Women: An Empirical Test of Knater'sHypothesis, 84 AM. J. Soc. 160 (1978).
A related study also deserves mention here. Smith, Kilpatrick, Suther, & Marcotte,
Male Student Professionals: Their Attitudes Toward Women, Sex and Change, 39
PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 143 (1976). Smith found that male law students had significantly
greater feminist views than other male professional students. These profeminist law
students also tended to be less dogmatic than the sampled nonlaw students.
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these feminist attacks on the legal system, legal education, and
mainstream theories in developmental psychology.
CONCLUSION

Many years ago, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow wrote of
"ships that pass in the night, and speak each other in passing,/
Only a signal shown and a distant voice in the darkness.

' 232

The

current separation of the fields of legal education and developmental psychology brings a chilling new significance to that nautical metaphor. Legal educators for the most part live alone on
their own separate ship, isolated almost completely from the
world of educational theory and developmental psychology. As
one critic of modem legal education recently stated: "[A]t most
law schools, the purposes and methods of teaching are regarded
as unfruitful, if not unfit, topics for conversation.

' 23 3

Unfortu-

nately, something very similar can be said about the field of
developmental psychology. Most developmental psychologists
seem to have little or no interest in what goes on in law schools.
No psychologist, for example, has examined law students in the
context of either William Perry's scheme of cognitive development or Kitchener's and King's ideas about reflective judgment.
Furthermore, although several psychologists/legal educators
have studied law students in light of Lawrence Kohlberg's scale
of moral development, the resulting reports seem to be either
seriously flawed or significantly out of date. Only a few psychologists have as yet made any serious empirical efforts to study law
students in light of the work of Carol Gilligan. Finally, no psychologists have examined law students in the context of the
work of Norma Haan.
Not only have the two ships of legal education and developmental psychology passed silently in the night, but they also
seem to be carrying the same cargo. In the field of developmental psychology, a fundamental dispute exists about the relative or
objective nature of truth. The same is true in legal education.
Furthermore, in the field of legal education, radical critics call
for change by attacking the very foundation of modem society in
the United States. The same is true in developmental psychology. Readers generally familiar with either the historical devel232. Longfellow, The Theologian's Tale: Elizabeth, in H. LONGFELLOW, TALES OF A
WAYSIDE INN

233.

224 (Riverside Press ed. 1913).

Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEo. L.J. 875, 875 (1985).
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opment of legal education theory or of psychological theory will
have realized that the attacks on mainstream theory-attacks on
both legal education theory by CLS proponents and on developmental psychology theory by radical feminist psychologists-are
launched from underlying epistemological perspectives which
have at earlier times rocked these respective fields. Although
often unrecognized, constant tension has existed for more than a
century between legal philosophers who advocate a conception
of truth as objective and legal philosophers who argue for an
essentially multiplistic or relativistic view of truth.2 34 The history of the development of psychological theory exposes this
same tension. Sigmund Freud's ideas generated violent resistance not only because of their substance, but also because of
Freud's pervasive skepticism about the objective nature of
235
truth.
In a sense, nothing could be a more fitting end to an Article
describing theories of intellectual and moral growth in law
school students than an end which is not an end. Thus, this
Article provides no answers to questions it has raised. It gives
no nod to objective or relative truth, Plato or Protagoras. "[lit
is better to travel than to arrive, "236 wrote Morris Bigge, capturing the essence of everything discussed in this Article. "Growth
is not a means to any ultimate or final end, but only to more
growth. ' 237 Unfortunately, growth always carries pain with it.
Surely Protagoras felt pain two millennia ago as he sailed off into
a sea of multiplicity and relativism. Surely Plato also felt pain as
he saw his own ideas about truth evolve over many years. This
in turn illustrates an important point. As William Perry has
noted, the pain of growth is not a shame of youth. Rather, it is
something that all growing people feel, all of their lives.
Perry concludes one of his many essays with a little story
about how teachers and students can share the pain of growth.238
234. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century AmericaMajor Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1986).
-235. In the context of this reference to Freud, a brief note about something written by

Jerome Frank seems appropos. Frank was one of the most important legal philosophers
during the early part of the twentieth century in the United States. He was also a great
defender of the legal, realist perspective.
Frank argued that the craving for absolute
certainty by so many judges, lawyers, and legal educators, "is a consequence of a childish
wish for father authority, which is transferred to the law." Id. at 458.
236. M. BIGGE, supra note 27, at 66.
237. Id.
238. Perry, Sharing, supra note 97, at 267, 272-73.
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This story, perhaps better than anything else, puts into final perspective all of the theories and ideas discussed in this Article. A
dynamic young student came to Perry and announced that she
was leaving school. He would never see her again. A long, long
silence followed. Finally, unable to bear the silence, Perry
spoke. "Growing is so bitter, so bittersweet."2 39 As the student
rose to leave, she recognized, as Perry perhaps had not, that the
two of them had been painfully growing along parallel routes.
She softly touched his hand. "And bittersweet for you, too."' "

239. Id. at 273 (emphasis in original).
240. Id.
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